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Comment
Parent Corporation Liability Under
CERCLA: Toward A Uniform Federal
Rule Of Decision
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (hereinafter CERCLA) in 1980.'
CERCLA provides legal procedures and funding mechanisms in an
attempt to abate the danger to public health and the environment
from the legacy of decades of improper storage and disposal of
hazardous wastes at thousands of inactive or abandoned dump sites
throughout the nation.' In what has been characterized as perhaps
the most radical environmental statute in American history,
3
CERCLA imposes liability for clean-up costs on a broad class of
potentially responsible parties.4 Adopted by Congress in a last
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1988)).
2. -[A] major new source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences
of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the 'inactive
hazardous waste site problem.'... Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive
problem." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADidIN. NEws 6119, 6120.
3. Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1465
(1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
4. See infra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (describing classes of parties implicated by
CERCLA as potentially liable for cleanup and other response costs).
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minute, hastily drawn compromise,5 CERCLA has little definitive
legislative history to aid courts in interpreting its ambiguous
liability provisions.6
Nevertheless, courts have found in the Act's language and
meager legislative history the basis to adopt broad and
controversial standards of joint and several retroactive strict
liability with loose causation requirements.7 The result of the
courts' application of expansive liability standards to CERCLA's
broad categories of potentially liable parties has been to extend
liability to remote parties with, at best, an attenuated connection to
the contaminated site.' These parties would not normally be liable
in tort9 or under traditional corporate law doctrines used to
disregard the corporate entity. 0
Although many of CERCLA's ambiguous liability provisions
have been definitively construed, considerable uncertainty still
5. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823,
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation,
marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions .... The courts are once again placed in the
undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation."), af'. in part, rev'd.
in part, 810 F. 2d 726 (8th cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Wade, 577
F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The Wade court commented that "[t]he Superfund legislation
[CERCLA] ... leaves much to be desired from a syntactical standpoint, perhaps a reflection of the
hasty compromises which were reached as the bill was pushed through Congress just before the close
of its 96th Session. Any attempt to divine the legislative intent behind many of its provisions will
inevitably involve a resort to the Act's legislative history. Unfortunately, the legislative history is
unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements." Id.
6. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080-81 (1st
Cir. 1986). The court commented that .. CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for
vaguely drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history.' ... CERCLA's
legislative history is shrouded with mystery .... Id. (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
898,902 (D.N.H. 1985)). See also infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (describing the ambiguity
of the legislative history of the Act's liability provisions).
7. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text (summarizing case law establishing
retroactive, joint and several strict liability under CERCLA and the Act's minimal causation
requirements).
8. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (giving examples of remote parties which
have been held liable under CERCLA).
9. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (noting liability under CERCLA can attach
despite absence of proof of elements of a traditional tort cause of action such as cause-in-fact and
proximate cause).
10. See infra notes 168-221,366 and accompanying text (summarizing cases holding parent
corporations and individual shareholders liable despite absence of factors traditionally used to justify
.'piercing the corporate veil"). See also infra note 64 (discussing cases holding corporate officers
personally liable).
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exists as to the applicable standards for ascertaining the liability of
a responsible party's parent corporation" for cleanup costs.
Recent decisions have articulated varying standards, ranging from
the traditional approach of piercing the corporate veil12 to virtual
strict liability of parent corporations.1 3 This uncertainty makes
financial forecasting and planning difficult for potentially liable
parent corporations. The uncertainty also impedes efficient
settlement of actions under CERCLA, consuming public and
private resources in otherwise avoidable litigation expenses, and
delays cleanup of sites posing risks to public health and natural
resources. 14
Part II of this Comment explores the general liability
provisions of CERCLA and the interpretation of these provisions
by the courts. 5 Part III provides an overview of state and federal
common law approaches traditionally, applied to determine whether
to disregard the corporate entity and to hold a parent corporation
liable for the acts of a subsidiary. 6 Next, the various standards
which have been applied in recent case law to determine the
liability of parent corporations under CERCLA are reviewed in Part
IV. 7 Part V evaluates alternative rules for finding parent
corporations liable under CERCLA based on the consonance of
each alternative with the objectives furthered by the Act's liability
scheme,18 and argues for adoption of a single federal rule of
decision applicable in CERCLA parent/subsidiary cases that is
consistent with the current general framework for liability under CERCLA.19
11. A parent company or corporation is one "owning more than 50 percent of the voting
shares, or otherwise a controlling interest, of another'" company, called the subsidiary. BLACK'S LAw
DIcTIoNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See infra notes 243-270 and accompanying text (discussing cases using traditional veil-
piercing doctrine).
13. See infra notes 168-191, 198 and accompanying text (discussing cases articulating a
• capacity to control" standard of liability).
14. See infra notes 286-288 and accompanying text (discussing benefits to the public and
private sectors of voluntary settlement).
15. See infra notes 20-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 83-160 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 161-281 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 282-396 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 372-396 and accompanying text.
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II. LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
A. Purposes of CERCLA
Following three years of deliberation on various hazardous
waste measures, Congress, in an eleventh hour compromise after
very limited debate,2" adopted "a relatively complex solution to
a complex problem." 21 Unlike much of the environmental
legislation passed in the previous decade,' CERCLA is not
primarily a regulatory program.' The sponsors of bills that
ultimately gave rise to passage of CERCLA introduced the initial
legislation to fill a void left by the principal hazardous waste
regulatory program, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 197624 (hereinafter RCRA). Although RCRA established a
comprehensive prospective "cradle-to-grave" regulatory program
governing hazardous waste storage, transport and disposal, it did
20. See generally Grad, A Legislative History ofthe Comprehensive Response, Compensation
and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 29-35 (1982) (tracing the
legislative history of the bills which led to CERCLA's adoption).
21. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
22. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,91 Stat. 685 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988));
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988)); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 StaL 1660
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988)).
23. CERCLA created a legal and financial apparatus to respond to the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances into the environment from already existing toxic dump sites. See
infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing the avenues for cleaning up sites and using and
reimbursing monies in the Superfund).
24. Pub. L No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)).
One of the bills which ultimately gave rise to congressional passage of CERCLA, H.R. 7020, entitled
the "Hazardous Waste Containment Act," was reported out of committee in the form of an
amendment to RCRA. See H.R. RP'. No. 1016, Pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119. See also infra note 25 and accompanying text
(describing gaps left by RCRA). See generally Grad, supra note 20, at 4-5, 8; W. FRANK & T.
ATIKcsoN, SuPERFuND: LITIGATION AND Ct.EANUP I (BNA 1985) (discussing how H.R. 7020, and
another of CERCLA's predecessors, S. 1480, the "Environmental Emergency Response Act," were
intended to fill gaps left by RCRA and state law).
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not redress the problem of waste already generated and stored.'
CERCLA responded to the health and environmental risks26 of
hazardous waste sites?' by establishing a fund (the
25. The House Report accompanying the original bill, H.R. 7020, stated:
(c) Deficiencies in RCRA have left important regulatory gaps.
(I) [RCRA] is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent that they
are posing an imminent hazard. Even there, the Act is no help if a financially
responsible owner of the site cannot be located .... It is the intent of the
Committee . . . to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and
financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with
abandoned and inactive disposal sites.
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6119, 6125.
26. The impetus for the hasty adoption of CERCLA was public reaction to the perceived
health and environmental risks posed by inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites, as symbolized
by the discovery of widespread contamination of a residential neighborhood adjacent to the former
16-acre Love Canal toxic dump site, on which a school had been constructed. See U.S. CONGRESS,
OFFcCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND'S PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED
22 (1989) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN] ("Superfund was born out of something close to public
hysteria, news stories about leaking toxic waste sites, vivid pictures of sites, and first-person accounts
of health effects"). See also Silverman, Love Canal. A Retrospective, 20 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 835
(September 15, 1989) (examining the environmental and health effects and legal implications of Love
Canal). In the years since enactment of CERCLA, however, the relative magnitude and seriousness
of actual risks posed to public health and to the environment by inactive and abandoned hazardous
waste sites has been questioned. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED
Bus mss: A COMPTIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) (finding that "total
health impacts [of hazardous waste sites] do not appear to match public concerns in most areas," and
that despite Superfund's statutory command of significant EPA resources, the program addresses
"low to medium- health and environmental risks). But see COMING CLEAN, supra, at 22 (finding
that exposure and risk assessments for many of the prevalent contaminants at toxic waste sites
support a conclusion that the health and environmental problems posed therefrom justify a
multibillion dollar program).
27. This Comment uses the terms "hazardous waste," "toxic waste," and "hazardous
substance" interchangeably. CERCLA uses only the term "hazardous substance." See 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14) (1988) (definition of hazardous substance, which includes substances defined as hazardous
by several earlier federal pollution control statutes as well as substances with respect to which the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken action pursuant to section
7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988))).
28. In 1979 it was estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 inactive or abandoned
hazardous waste sites existed, of which 1,200 to 2,000 presented serious public health risks. H.R.
REP. No. 1016,96th CONG., 2D SESS. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
6119, 6120. In December 1984, EPA, which is charged with administering CERCLA, reported to
Congress that between 130,000 and 378,000 sites may eventually have to be reviewed as potential
candidates for government-initiated response actions under CERCLA. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EXTENT oF THE HAZARDOus RELEASE PROBLEM AND FUTURE FuNDING
NEEDS, CERCLA SECTION 301(a)(1)(C) STUDY-FINAL REPORT 5-3 (1984). More recently, EPA
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"Superfund")29 to finance waste site cleanups and by imposing
civil liability for the costs of cleanup and natural resources
damage31 on a wide range of "potentially responsible parties.--
3 2
B. Administrative/Legal and Funding Mechanisms for Cleanup of
Waste Sites
CERCLA requires the Environmental Protection Agency
33
(EPA) to compile a National Priority List (NPL) of hazardous
officials and other analysts have put the total number of sites likely to require remediation in the
range of 27,000 to more than 400,000. GAO Finds 425,380 Potential Superfund Sites; Florio Hits
EPA for Delays in Site Assessments, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (January 22, 1988).
29. CERCLA established two funds to pay for site cleanup. Pub. L. No. 96-510, §§ 221,232,
94 Stat. 2801, 2804 (1980). Known colloquially as "'Superfund," the "Hazardous Substance
Response Trust Fund" was reauthorized and renamed by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) as the "Hazardous Substance Superfund." SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§§ 4, 204, 100 Stat 1696 (1986) (codified in part at 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611-12, 4661-62, 4671-72,
9507 (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(p) (1988)). Of the initial Superfund of $1.6 billion for the period from
1982 to 1986, 87.5% came from special taxes on petroleum and certain chemicals. 26 U.S.C. §§
4612, 4661-62 (1982). 12.5% came from general revenue appropriations. Id. § 9631(b)(2). SARA
increased the amount of monies in the Superfund and broadened the base from which they are
collected: the $8.5 billion authorized over the period 1987 through 1991 will be collected from the
following sources- tax on petroleum (32.5%); tax on feedstock chemicals (16.7%); a general
.'environmental tax" on corporations (29%); interest, recoveries and penalties (6.4%); and general
revenues (14.7%). SARA, Pub. L No. 99-499, §§ 511-517, 100 Stat. 1760-65, 1767, 1770, 1772
(1986) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611-12, 4661-62, 4671-72, 9507 (1988). CERCLA also
established another fund, the "Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund," which assumed the liability of
owners and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities which had been closed pursuant to RCRA
regulations. CERCLA §§ 107(k), 111(j), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(k), 96110) (1982). This fund was
terminated by SARA. SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §514, 100 Stat. 1767 (1986).
30. The term "cleanup" as used in this comment refers to the containment, mitigation,
abatement or elimination of the hazards and threats present at a hazardous waste site.
31. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(C) (1988) (imposing liability for "injury to ... or loss of natural
resources'.).
32. Id. § 9607(a). See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing who are
responsible parties). The term "responsible parties" or "potentially responsible parties" as used in
this comment refers to those "persons who would or might be liable" under § 107(a) of CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See also infra note 53 (CERCLA definition of "person").
33. CERCLA directs the President to fulfill certain responsibilities under the Act, including
preparation of a priority list of hazardous waste sites needing remediation. See infra note 34 and
accompanying text. However, the President delegated most of these tasks, including preparation of
the priority list of sites, to EPA. Exec. Order No. 12,316, § 1(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981). See
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987) (revoking Exec. Order 12,316 and delegating
duties and responsibilities under CERCLA as amended by SARA). EPA continues to be responsible
for preparation of the priority list. Id. § l(b)(1).
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waste sites in need of remedial action.' Priorities are based on
the relative risk or danger to public health or the environment from
known or threatened releases.35
CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),36 provides an array of
mechanisms to clean up sites on the NPL. EPA can prompt
cleanup by executing a settlement agreement with responsible
parties," or by issuing an administrative order or obtaining a
court order directing responsible parties to undertake specified
remedial actions.3 Alternatively, EPA itself can undertake
remedial action financed by Superfund and may later sue any
identifiable and solvent responsible party for reimbursement to
Superfund.39 Apart from EPA initiative, CERCLA authorizes
private parties who clean up sites to recover costs from responsible
parties40 or from the Superfund.4V '
Courts have found congressional intent in the Act that
responsible parties bear the principal burden for financing site
response measures.42 Public resources available for cleanup are
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988). The NPL is an element of the National Contingency
Plan. Id. § 9605. See 54 Fed. Reg. 41025 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300, Appendix B)
(the current NPL includes 948 sites).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8) (1988).
36. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9622 (1988). As enacted in 1980, CERCLA contained no provisions
addressing settlements. SARA added provisions to encourage and facilitate voluntary settlement. 42
U.S.C. 9622 (1988). For example, the statute established a procedure for EPA to provide potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) with information about a site and then allow a grace period for
negotiations. Id. § 9622(e). In addition, SARA established a foundation for extensive litigation
concerning contribution among uncooperative PRPs if they choose not to cooperate. Id. § 9613(0
(expressly providing for contribution actions). See infra notes 283-288 and accompanying text
(discussing the benefits of settlement to both the public and private sectors). See generally Atkeson,
Goldberg, Ellrod & Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund AmEndments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. 10360, 10407-08, 10410-12 (Envtl. L. Inst.)
(Dec. 1986).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988).
39. Id. §§ 9607(a), 9611.
40. Id. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(0.
41. Id. §§ 9611-9612.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp.
823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726,
733 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 892
(E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (ED. Pa. 1983); Ohio ex rel.
860
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quite limited relative to the immensity of the hazardous waste
problem.43 The total response costs" at the 2,000 sites expected
to be listed on the NPL has been estimated at $50 to $100
billion.45 At the current level of Superfund revenues ($8.5 billion
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See also infra note 48 and
accompanying text (citing legislative history).
43. J. Winston Porter, Assistant EPA Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response
during the Superfund reauthorization hearings, stated, "'There is probably not enough money in the
world to cleanup all of the sites permanently." High Cost of Permanent Superfund Cleanups to
Result in Interim Actions, 17 Env't. Rep. 778 (BNA) (Sept. 26, 1986).
44. -'Response costs" refers generally to money spent to respond to contamination at a
hazardous waste site. More specifically, response costs are (I) all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States government or a state that are not inconsistent with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP); (2) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the NCP; (3) damage for injury to, or destruction or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury; and (4) the costs of health assessments or
health effects study carried out pursuant to section 9604(i) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)(A)-(D)
(1988). Removal costs include the costs of removing hazardous substances from a site deemed by
EPA to be necessary to protect public health, welfare or the environment, including removal of
hazardous substances from any contaminated natural resources, as well as the temporary or permanent
relocation of residents. Id. § 9601(23). Remedial actions at the site include the costs of providing
alternative drinking water supplies and restoring ground and surface water to a level that assures
protection of public health. Id. § 9601(24). In addition, the courts have interpreted response costs to
include a wide variety of expenses incurred in connection with implementing the Act. See, e.g.,
Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 850-52 (response costs include the government's
litigation costs and attorneys' fees; salaries and expenses associated with the government's
monitoring, assessing and evaluating the release of contaminants; expenses associated with the
government's actions taken to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage that might result from the
release or threat of release of contaminants from a hazardous waste disposal site; prejudgment interest
at the rate of nine percent a year, calculated from the date the complaint was filed under CERCLA;
and all future costs of removal or remedial actions that are consistent with the NCP and incurred by
the government in cleaning up a hazardous waste site). Moreover, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's holding that response costs may not include site cleanup and related
expenses jncurred prior to the enactment of CERCLA United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 735 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
45. Comment, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6
STAN. ENVTL 1. L J. 271,281 (1987) [hereinafter Deep Pockets]. The author based his figures on EPA
estimates of net costs to the federal government of $11.7 billion to $22.7 billion, which assumed that
responsible parties would bear 40 to 60 percent of total response costs. Id. (citing U.S.
ENVIRoNMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXTENT OF THE HAZARDOUS RELEASE PROBLEM AND
FuTURE FUNDN NEEDS, CERCLA SECTION 301(a)(1)(C) STUDY-FINAL REPORT 5-3 (1984)).
Because EPA based these estimates on the original CERCLA cleanup standards, not on the more
stringent standards adopted by SARA section 121, the author relied on statements made by EPA
officials indicating that cleanup costs under SARA standards could be three to ten times the average
cleanup cost under CERCLA to arrive atthis cost range. Id. at 281-82 and n.45. See also U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY 13 (1985) (OTA considers
it likely that the cleanup costs for 1,800 NPL sites will exceed $100 billion over the next 50 years);
COMING CLEAN, supra note 26, at 27 (the nation has spent only about one to two percent of what
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for the period from 1987 to 1991),4 if the full cost burden were
to fall on the fund, it would take thirty to sixty years to finance
response costs for the 2,000 NPL sites. Alternatively, if responsible
parties bear forty to sixty percent of cleanup costs, at current
funding levels it would require about half as long to remediate the
2,000 sites.
C. CERCLA's Liability Scheme
With at least some idea of the formidable dimensions of the
cleanup taskV' Congress enacted CERCLA to expedite site
remediation and to allocate the costs to those responsible for the
risks posed by the inadequate disposal of hazardous waste.4" To
accomplish these ends, CERCLA imposed a far-reaching liability
scheme which, it has been argued, was intended to find a party to
assume liability in virtually every case.
4 9
ultimately might be spent by all parties to clean up chemically contaminated sites-now roughly
estimated by OTA at $500 billion over 50 years).
46. SARA Title V, Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 511-17, 100 Stat.
1760-1765, 1767, 1770, 1772 (1986) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 4671-
4672, 9507 (1988)).
47. "Congress and the American public became more aware of the magnitude and expense
of the problems associated with inactive sites as the Love Canal and similar sites came to the
forefront." United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 835
(W.D. Mo. 1984). See also supra notes 2, 26 and accompanying text (discussing impetus to adoption
of CERCLA provided by discovery of extensive contamination of residences near Love Canal).
48. The Senate report on the original CERCLA bill reveals several objectives of the broad
liability scheme: to ensure that those responsible for creating the hazardous waste problem bear the
burden of remedying the problem, to ensure that the social cost of unsafe disposal practices is
internalized by the industries that generate waste, to create incentives for safer behavior for those
parties who possess the greatest knowledge about the risks associated with their wastes and who are
in the best position to control disposal decisions, to spread cleanup costs among as many parties as
possible, and to promote efficient resource allocation among industries. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12-15, 31-34 (1980). But see infra notes 321-323 and accompanying text (CERCLA's
liability system does not necessarily operate primarily to further the ends of corrective justice,
deterrence or restitution, but perhaps functions more to compensate the government for costs incurred
in cleanups financed by Superfund).
49. Comment, Toward an Optimal System of Successor Liability for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 226, 232 (1987) [hereinafter Successor Liability] (noting that
Superfund's supporters recognized that traditional common law theories would fail to generate funds
needed for cleanup because the most culpable party, on whom the common law placed liability, is
often insolvent or non-existent).
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The liability provisions in CERCLA are among the most
sketchy and ambiguous in an act roundly criticized for its
vagueness.5" Although developing CERCLA case law has resolved
many of the uncertainties pertaining to the scope of CERCLA
liability,51 uncertainty remains with respect to the liability of a
few categories of potentially responsible parties, among them
parent corporations of subsidiary responsible parties.52 To provide
the context for the evaluation in Part V of the alternative
approaches the courts have applied to the determination of parent
corporation liability, this section examines the general statutory
scheme of CERCLA liability and its interpretation by the courts.
50. In considering the scope of liability under the Act, one court supported its observation that
CERCLA was hastily and inadequately drafted by citing statements of two members of Congress as
indicative of the attitude of the House of Representatives when confronted with the Senate
compromise bill. Representative Gibbons stated:
I am not happy with this bill, but I would be far sadder if we did not pass it.
We must begin .... We have been working on this problem for a year, and
the problem gets worse every day, and we have only got 2 days left in the
legislative session.
United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 n.1 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (citation
omitted). The court also noted that "Representative Harsha complained that the final version was
vague and internally inconsistent to such an extent that the 'bill is not a superfund bill-it's a welfare
and relief act for lawyers."' Id. (citation omitted). See Note, Developments in the Law, supra note
3, at 1512 (discussing legislative history of the liability provisions). See also supra note 5 (courts'
comments on the unhelpfulness of CERCLA's limited legislative history in construing the Act's
vague provisions).
51. See infra notes 53-82 and accompanying text (discussing standards and scope of liability
as construed by the courts).
52. Another important unresolved issue of CERCLA liability pertains to the liability of secured
creditors. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (a secured
creditor may incur CERCLA liability by participating in the financial management of a facility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes), cert,
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
6, 1985) (mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices is not sufficient for imposition of
liability).
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1. Who May Be Liable
CERCLA sets forth four categories of "persons" 53 who may
be held liable for site response costs: 54 (1) Cuirent owners and
operators of a hazardous waste facility where there is a release or
a threat of a release of hazardous substances;55 (2) those who
owned or operated the disposal facility at the time the leaking
wastes were disposed of;56 (3) generators of hazardous waste who
arranged for disposal of waste that is leaking or threatening to
leak;57 or (4) those who accepted hazardous waste for transport to
a facility from which there is a release or a threatened release.53
The statutory definitions of each category of potentially
responsible parties are very broad, 59 and the courts have generally
construed the definitiofis expansively.' For example, a lessee of
53. CERCLA denrmes "'person" as "an individual, fin, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
54. See supra note 44 (expenses and other items included as response costs).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988).
56. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
57. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
58. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
59. See supra notes 53, 55-58 and accompanying text (delineating the Act's categories of
responsible parties). The denrmition of "'owner or operator" under the Act is similarly broad:
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person
owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an
onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and (ii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was
conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or
similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately
beforehand. Such term does not include a person who, without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id. §9601(20)(A) (1988).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding a secured lender liable as an owrier or operator notwithstanding an exemption for such
lenders, noting that ambiguous statutory terms should be interpreted to favor liability to achieve
CERCLA's remedial goals) cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373,1380-81 (8th Cir. 1989) (construing broadly the scope of liability under section
107(a)(3) and noting that a liberal interpretation is consistent with CERCLA's overwhelmingly
remedial statutory scheme); United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 864 (D.Del.
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property has been held to be an "owner" when its sublessee
operated a disposal facility on the property.61 One court even held
that a chemical firm that held title to a hazardous waste disposal
site for one hour was not as a matter of law outside the reach of
CERCLA's definition of responsible parties.62 Current landowners
are liable even if the toxic waste was disposed of before the
landowner purchased the property.63 Although neither legislative
history nor the express language of CERCLA specifically provide
for corporate officer liability, courts addressing the issue have had
little difficulty in finding officers individually liable as operators
under CERCLA.64
1989) (noting that generally the cases have construed the term -operator" broadly).
61. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003
(D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part on other grounds, rev "d in part on other grounds sub nom. United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
62. United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698, 20,699 (D.S.C.
June 15, 1984) (court remanded for determination of the extent of defendant's control over the land,
where defendant had acted as a conduit in a sale of the property on which the disposal site was
based).
63. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-45 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that a narrow definition of responsible parties, one that excluded successor owners of waste
sites from liability, would too often place the only solvent parties connected with a waste site beyond
the reach of CERCLA); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-80 (D.
Md. 1986) (citing congressional intent as basis for narrowly construing the secured lender exemption,
to hold a bank that purchased property at a foreclosure sale liable as an owner). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (35)(A)-(B) (1988) (provision added by SARA which exonerates a buyer from liability if the
buyer purchased without knowing that hazardous substances were present at the site following a good
faith and diligent effort to determine whether such wastes were present). But see D. HAYEs & C.
MAcKERRON, SuPERFuND II: A NEW MANDATE Z9-30 (1987) (unlikely that many landowners will
be able to satisfy evidentiary requirements of section 9601(35)(A)-(3)).
64. Courts generally have not pierced the corporate veil, but have instead relied on the plain
meaning of the statutory terms "'person" and "'owner or operator," which they read as applying to
officers. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726,743 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052
(2d Cir. 1985); Kelley ex. rel Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 1214, 1217-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp.
742, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,190 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Mottolo,
605 F. Supp. 898, 913-14 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,698, 20,700 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984). See generally Comment, Dissolving the Corporate
Veil: Corporate Officer Liability for Response Costs Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act, 17 ToL L. REv. 923 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Corporate Officer Liability]; Comment, Corporate Officer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal.
What Are the Consequences?, 38 MEacER L Rnv. 677, 680, 686 (1987). In one case, however, the
court held an individual disposal site owner-operator liable on multiple grounds, including derivative
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2. Standards and Scope of Liability
CERCLA, as interpreted by the courts, imposes a standard of
liability more sweeping than any the tort system has yet
developed.' The courts have held that liability is strict,"
retroactive,67 and generally joint and several." They have also
liability from piercing the corporate veil. United States v. Mottolo, 695 F.Supp. 615, 623-24 (D.N.H.
1988) (finding that CERCLA's goal of corrective justice "would be frustrated if the mere act of
incorporation were allowed to impede the recovery of response costs" and that "CERCLA places
no importance on the corporate form[,]" citing "the absence of explicit statutory language addressing
the effect of incorporation, the Act's strict liability scheme, and the broad and encompassing
categories of potentially responsible parties ... ). See supra notes 53 (definition of "person") and
59 (definition of -'owner or operator") and accompanying text. See also Northeastern
Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 743 (holding that 'Congress could have limited the statutory defmition
of 'person' but chose not to do so," and that "construction of CERCLA to impose liability upon
only the corporation and not the individual corporate officers and employees who are responsible for
making corporate decisions about the handling and disposal of hazardous substances would open an
enormous, and clearly unintended, loophole in the statutory scheme"). Many courts have avoided the
general common law rule of limited liability applicable to corporate officers by applying a
traditionally recognized exception: that a corporate officer is personally liable for corporate wrongful
acts when the officer personally participates in the wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1052; Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744; Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 894-95;
Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 187; United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 914 (D.N.H.
1985). However, in applying this exception, some courts have stretched the facts to support personal
participation by the officer. See, e.g., Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895 (finding that the personal
participation requirement was met by a corporate president who had no knowledge of the illegal
dumping but who had been personally involved in the decision to have a particular individual dispose
of the hazardous waste); Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 190 (finding the personal participation
requirement satisfied by active participation by a corporate officer in the general management of a
disposal facility); ARCO Indus. 723 F. Supp. at 1218 (predicating personal liability upon a corporate
officer's authority to control the company's waste disposal practices, even in the absence of any
active involvement or direct supervision of such activities). Holding corporate officers individually
liable under CERCLA is particularly harsh in light of the Act's joint and several strict liability
imposed retroactively on the basis of weak causation requirements: an individual who disposed of
hazardous waste in full conformance with the then-applicable laws and regulations may alone bear
the entire burden of extensive cleanup costs. See Comment, Refining the Scoope of CERCLA's Veil-
Piercing Remedy, 6 STAN. Evwm. LJ. 43,69-75 (1986) [hereinafter Refining the Scope] (CERCLA's
unprecedented features for imposing liability on individuals are inappropriately punitive).
65. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1542; Comment, Deep Pocket, supra note
45, at 298, 310-11.
66. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' holding that liability
under CERCLA is strict).
67. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' holding that CERCLA
liability is retroactive).
68. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' holding that liability
under CERCLA may be joint and several).
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interpreted CERCLA as imposing this liability without requiring
definitive proof of causation."
Except for very limited statutory defenses, 70  courts have
consistently held that liability under CERCLA is strict.71 While
the statutory language contains no explicit standard of
culpability,72 the legislative history, though somewhat ambiguous,
69. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' holding that CERCLA
does not require definite proof of causation).
70. CERCLA section 107(b) states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable
who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of
a hazardous substance and the dangers resulting therefrom were caused solely by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war,
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs
in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly with the defendant..., if the defendant establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions; or (4) any combination of the foregoing
paragraphs.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). See supra note 63 (discussing "innocent purchaser' exemption added
by SARA).
71. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (rejecting defense
of compliance with existing laws and exercising reasonable care at the time of disposal); United
States v. Price, 557 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.NJ. 1983) (pointing out that the due care defense
would be meaningless without strict liability, that strict liability fits the goals of CERCLA to spread
the costs and to force responsible parties to bear the cost, and that the fulfillment of these
congressional goals was more likely to be effectuated if the defendants who allegedly contributed to
the problem were held to a very stringent standard of liability).
72. CERCLA section 107(a) states simply that enumerated parties "shall be liable" for
cleanup costs, leaving the standard of liability undefined. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). CERCLA
section 101(32) provides that the standard of liability shall be that imposed under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Id. § 9601(32). However, the relevant language of the FWPCA
mirrors that of CERCLA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (FWPCA liability provision). Cases
interpreting this provision have imposed strict liability. See, e.g., United States v. LeBoeuf Bros.
Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980); Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596
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tends to support imposition of strict liability.73 Similarly, in the
absence of explicit statutory language but with some supporting
legislative history,7 4 courts have concluded that joint and several
liability is appropriate under CERCLA when there is indivisible harm.75
F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
73. To secure sufficient votes for passage, CERCLA's sponsors deleted provisions in previous
versions of the bill which explicitly set standards of strict liability and joint and several liability.
Grad, supra note 20, at 19-22. A CERCLA sponsor, Senator Randolph, explained the compromise
bill as follows:
Unless otherwise provided in this act, the standard of liability is intended to
be the same as that provided in section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1321). I understand this to be a standard of strict
liability. It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An
example is joint and several liability. Any reference to these terms have been
deleted, and the liability of joint tort feasors will be determined under common
or previous statutory law.
126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
74. Although Congress deleted a provision which would have held partiesjointly and severally
liable, this deletion has not been regarded as a rejection of that concept. See id. (remarks of Sen.
Randolph indicating that the provision was deleted in order to leave the issue to be resolved by the
courts through the common law of torts). However, in reauthorizing CERCLA by adopting SARA,
Congress appears to have endorsed the imposition of joint and several liability where the harm is
indivisible. H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMzN. NEws 2840 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 253 (111), 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3038; 132 CONG. REc. H9563 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of
Rep. Dingell).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. -Supp. 162, 214 (W.D. Mo.
1985); Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 844 (fimding that "[a]Ithough explicit reference
to joint and several liability was deleted from the final enactment,... joint and several liability is
at least permissible, if not mandated, under the facts of this case."); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Congress deleted the joint and several liability
provision in CERCLA to avoid creating a mandatory legislative standard that would be inappropriate
in certain circumstances); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (joint and
several liability should be imposed upon responsible defendants, unless defendants establish that a
reasonable basis exists for apportioning harm among them); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 1984). But see United States v. A & F
Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (a court may apportion liability even
where the harm is indivisible); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100,
1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (following the A & F Materials court's approach). Courts have almost
invariably rejected defendants' arguments that harm could be divided, and thus liability apportioned,
according to the relative volume of waste deposited at the site, since harm may be caused by the
synergistic effects of the typical commingling at waste sites of a veritable potpourri of toxic fluids.
See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3156 (1989); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F.Supp. 706, 725 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Stringfellow,
661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); South Carolina Recycling, 643 F. Supp. at 994-95; Chem-
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Although CERCLA contains no explicit provision imposing
retroactive liability, the Act's legislative history suggests that it
should be so interpreted.76 CERCLA was enacted to remedy
environmental and public health hazards that had already been
created.77 Accordingly, courts have concluded that CERCLA
allows imposition of liability on parties who disposed of hazardous
substances before the effective date of the act.
78
Courts have interpreted CERCLA as requiring only a very
weak showing of causation to impose liability. Although the bill
passed by the House of Representatives specified that parties could
be held liable only if they had "caused or contributed to" a release
of a hazardous substance,79 the compromise bill adopted
Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811. But see United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. 1152
(BNA) (D.N.H. 1986) (finding that the number of drums sent to a site by each generator constituted
a reasonable basis for determining contribution to the harm). However, numerous courts have stated
that volume, along with other factors, is relevant in apportioning damages in settlements or actions
for contribution among responsible parties. See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F.
Supp. 1027, 104546 (D.Mass. 1989), aff'd. 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); Conservation Chem., 628
F. Supp. at 401; United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905, 1910 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
76. See supra notes 2, 26 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus for enactment of
CERCLA).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Corp., Inc., 810 F.2d 726,
733, 737 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.
Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985); State of Ohio ey. rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1314 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (S.D. Ill.
1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 112-13 (D.NJ. 1983); United States v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113 (D. Minn. 1982). Courts have rejected constitutional
challenges to CERCLA's retroactivity under the due process, contract and takings clauses of the
United States Constitution. See Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 733-34; United States v.
South Carolina Recycling, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,996-97 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in relevant part sub
nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cit. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3156 (1989). See generally Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1555-65 (discussing
constitutional challenges to retroactive liability).
79. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a)(1), 126 CONW. RF.c. 26,779 (1980). The
committee report stated that:
The Committee intends that the usual common law principles of causation,
including those of proximate causation, should govern the determination of
whether a defendant "'caused or contributed" to a release or threatened release
.... Thus, for instance, the mere act of generation or transportation of
hazardous waste, or the mere existence of a generator's or transporter's waste
in a site with respect to which cleanup costs are incurred would not, in and of
itself, result in liability under section 3071.
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eliminated this clause."0 Most of the litigation on the causation
issue has involved generators. The cases support the general
proposition that for a producer of toxic waste to be liable under
CERCLA all that is required is a showing that (1) the generator's
waste was disposed of at the site, (2) hazardous substances present
in the generator's waste are found at the site, and (3) there was a
release or threat of release of any hazardous substance at the site
causing the government to incur response costs.8'
Together, the components of CERCLA's liability system
function to extend liability not only to those parties directly
responsible for the disposal of hazardous substances, but also to
those with very remote connections to the site. The broad
categories of potentially liable parties, weak causation
requirements, and joint and several strict liability provisions tend
to ensure that site response costs will be borne by a "responsible
party" rather than by the Superfund. 2
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONe.
& ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6136.
90. See 126 CONO. REc.31,969 (1980). See also supra note72 and accompanying text (noting
that the final version of CERCLA section 107 states simply that enumerated parties "shall be
liable"); supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that section 107 provides for very limited
causation-based defenses).
81. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-34 (F.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting the
argument that in order for generators to be liable, the government must specifically prove that the
hazardous material found at the site had its origins at the generator's plant and 'inding that to require
the government to 'fmgerprint' each waste would "eviscerate" the statute and defeat congressional
intent); accord United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309-10 (FD. Mo. 1987); Violet v. Picillo,
638 F. Supp. 1283, 1291-93 (D.R.L 1986); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 992-93 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in relevant part sub nor. United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cit. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989). Causation
has been litigated in landowner liability cases as well. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1152-56 (1st Cir. 1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that CERCLA required proof that the
defendant landowner "'caused" the potentially hazardous condition requiring cleanup).
82. See infra notes 292-336 and accompanying text (summmarizing the objectives furthered
by CERCLA's liability scheme in connection with evaluation of alternative rules of decision to guide
inquiries as to parent corporation liability under CERCLA).
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III. TRADmONAL DOCTmNS OF PARENT CORPORATION
LIABILTY UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Neither explicitly addressed by CERCLA's text nor illuminated
by legislative history are the circumstances under which a
responsible party may be disregarded as a corporate entity and the
responsible party's shareholders, either individuals or a parent
corporation, may be held liable for site cleanup costs. To provide
perspective for the consideration, in Part IV, of the different
approaches taken to piercing the corporate veil or otherwise finding
shareholders liable under CERCLA this part reviews the traditional
corporate law doctrines which provide the basis for the piercing
remedy and the manner in which the doctrines have been applied
under federal and state law.
A. Rationale for the Tenet of Limited Liability
The principle of limited liability of corporate shareholders
remains a dominant characteristic of American corporate law.83
Ordinarily, a shareholder's liability is limited to the amount of
capital invested in or promised to the enterprise." Beyond that, a
corporate creditor has recourse only against the corporate entity
incurring the liability, not against individual or corporate
shareholders.85
Limited liability is based on the economic policy that
shareholders should be encouraged to commit limited amounts of
capital to an endeavor which might be too risky for direct
individual involvement. 6 Although the significant role played by
83. Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. See A. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTrvE § 270 (1976).
85. See generally H. BA.ANTINF, CORPORATIONS, § 118, at 288 (rev. ed. 1946). '[A]
corporation and its shareholders are not liable on each other's contracts. The immunity of the
shareholders from corporate obligations is one of the most important ihcidents and advantages of the
separate legal entity, and serves a useful purpose in business life." Id.
86. Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENVER LJ. 1,
2 (1978). See Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L 573, 574-604
(1986) (describing the history and rationale of the development of limited liability in English
common law and in the United States).
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limited liability in the development of modem corporations and in
the expansion of industry was generally conceded in the early part
of this century,8 7 a number of scholars in recent years have
questioned the economic value and social utility of limited
liability.88 The necessity and appropriateness of limited liability
has been subjected to especially pointed criticism when the doctrine
serves to protect a parent corporation from liability for the
obligations of its subsidiary. 9 One authority concludes that while
limited liability serves valuable purposes for the ultimate investor
by creating a more efficient economic system, most of these
advantages are valid only when limited liability is interposed for
protection of the ultimate investor.9°
B. Common Law Formulations and Applications of the Doctrine
of Piercing the Corporate Veil-
Notwithstanding the criticisms leveled at limited liability, the
concept remains fundamental to American corporate law.91
However, the doctrine is not absolute. In certain cases where the
rule of limited liability would promote injustice among the parties,
courts exercise their equity power to disregard the corporate entity
and "pierce the corporate veil,"'  holding individual or parent
87. See Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
Yya.E IJ. 193, 193 (1929) ("no one would claim that the availability of limited liability played an
insignificant part in the expansion of industry and in the growth of trade and commerce. It has had
a potent influence"); Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv.
259, 262-63 (1967) (the modem publicly held corporation with many small shareholders could not
exist without limited liability).
88. See Blumberg, supra note 86, at 616-30; Meiners, Mofsky and Tollison, Piercing the Veil
of Limited Liability, 4 DEt.. J. CoRP. L. 351, 352, 363 (1979); Landers, A Unified Approach to
Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHm. L. REv. 589, 617-28 (1975).
See generally Halpem, Trebilock and Turnbull, An Economic'Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. ToRoNo LI. 117 (1980).
89. See Blumberg, supra note 86, at 616-30.
90. Id. at 575-76. Blumberg finds that limited liability raises serious concerns because it
enables the enterprise to externalize its costs. Id. at 576.
91. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 2.
92. See H. BAL.ENTINEsupra note 85, § 122 at 292-93. "[The courts place limitations upon
th[e] [separate corporate entity] privilege . . ." based on a "study of the just and reasonable
limitations upon the exercise of the privilege of separate capacity under particular circumstances in
view of its proper use and functions. If the separate corporate capacity is perverted to dishonest uses,
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corporation shareholders personally liable for the debts of the
corporate enterprise.93
Although the black letter rule of limited shareholder liability
can be stated with precision, the same cannot be said with regard
to the piercing doctrine.' Perhaps because disregarding the
corporate fiction is an equitable remedy95 the use of which is
highly fact-specific, the courts have inconsistently and sometimes
unclearly determined how and when to pierce the veil." Case
opinions in which shareholders have been found liable for
corporate obligations are replete with unhelpful rhetoric and
metaphors such as "mere instrumentality," "alter ego,"
"dummy," or "dry shell," which do little more than state
conclusions. 97 As a consequence, formulations of the veil-piercing
as to evade obligations or statutory restrictions, the courts will interpose to prevent the abuse." Id.
93. It should be noted that there are other legal remedies or theories aside from piercing the
corporate veil which would achieve the same end of holding shareholders liable for the debts of the
corporate entity. These include agency, fraud, estoppel, contract or quasi-contract theories such as
unjust enrichment. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 3-6 and (discussing these alternative bases for
relief). The distinction between agency theory and a piercing the corporate veil theory has posed
particular difficulties for scholars and judges alike. See id. at 3 n.9 (citing Judge Learned Hand's
"sensible distinction" in Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267
(2d Cir. 1929), that express agency would not provide a remedy because the consensual element
would be lacking, and that implied agency would be inappropriate because that would mean that the
veil would be pierced in every situation); Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary
or Affiliate, 71 HARe. L REV. 1122, 1123-24 (1958) [hereinafter Liability of a Parent Corporation];
Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REv. 979, 983-84 (1971); Downs, Piercing the
Corporate Veil - Do Corporations Provide Limited Personal Liability?, 53 UMKC L REV. 174,
190-91 (1985) (distinction between instances when a shareholder controls a corporation so as to
justify piercing its veil, and those in which a true agency relationship exists).
94. Note, Liability of a Parent Corporation, supra note 93, at 1123-24; Note, Piercing the
Corporate Law Veil: The After Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853,
853-55 (1982) [hereinafter Alter Ego Doctrine].
95. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, § 146, at 346 (3rd ed. 1983); 1 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.25, at 426 (rev. penn. ed.
1983).
96. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 7. See National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 256 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (noting that the cases "simply lay down broad
principles to guide the courts and the decision of each individual case rests almost completely upon
the facts of that case"). See generally H. BAL.LrEnNE, supra note 85, at 293. "There is no general
formula for all cases such as 'alter ego' or 'instrumentality.' Each situation must be considered by
the courts on its merits". Id.
97. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). In Berkey,
Justice Cardozo stated that the "whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary
corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be
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doctrine vary among the states.9 This variability, along with
inconsistent application of the same rule within a given jurisdiction,
has created difficulties for lawyers and their clients in predicting
the outcome of challenges to the corporate entity.' Moreover, as
discussed in the following section, the uncertainty is compounded
in federal question cases such as those involving the interpretation
of CERCLA because it is frequently unclear whether state law or
a uniform federal rule of decision is to be used.'0°
Two somewhat different formulations of the piercing rule
predominate in the case law. One, a two-prong test, is to a large
extent a more generalized version of the second, a three-part
inquiry.
1. The General Two-Prong Rule
Under the more general formulation of the rule, two basic
requirements must be satisfied to disregard the corporate entity.
First, there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholders no
longer exist, and second, observance of the corporate form under
the circumstances of the case would permit fraud or injustice.1"'
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Id. See
also Baker v. Raymond Int'l., Inc., 656 F.2d 173,179 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that"[t]hese gnomic
phrases ... describe results, but not the reasoning that leads to those results; they tell us nothing
about the basis for imposition of liability"); H. HENN & J. ALExANDER, supra note 95, § 146, at 344
and n.2 (observing that the "judicial opinions indulge in verbal characterizations, epithets and
metaphors . . ."); H. BALLENIN_, supra note 85, at 293. "The figurative terminology and formulae
as to disregard of fictions invoked by the judges often obscure the real issues .... There is no
general formula for all cases such as 'alter ego' or 'instrumentality."' Id.
98. 1 W. FLE'cl-mR, supra note 95, § 41, at 388.
99. Downs, supra note 93, at 175. See Ballentine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations, 14 CAuIF. L. REV. 12, 15 (1925) (referring to this area of the law as a "legal
quagmire"). See also Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 7 (noting that the courts "reluctantly,
inconsistently and sometimes unclearly determine how and when to pierce").
100. See infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text (discussing split of authority as to whether
state law or federal common law should apply in federal question cases).
101. 1 W. FRzrCHER, supra note 95, § 41.30, at 428. The general rule has also been stated in
terms indicating that the corporation as a separate legal entity is a legal theory that exists for
"convenience and to serve the ends of justice" and the courts "decline to recognize [the corporate
entity] whenever recognition would ... extend the principle of incorporation 'beyond its legitimate
purposes and [would] produce injustices or inequitable consequences."' DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc.
874.
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The first prong may be satisfied by a showing that the shareholders
dominate and control the corporation. 2 The second prong is less
well-defied,'0 3 and allows courts to apply their equity powers
flexibly, on a case-by-case basis, to do justice to injured
creditors." 4
2. The Three-Prong Rule
The other common formulation of the veil-piercing doctrine is
a three-part test 0" which requires a showing of: (1) Control by
the shareholders of the corporation, amounting to complete
domination of finances, policy and business practice with respect
to the transaction attacked such that the corporate entity as to this
transaction had no separate will or existence of its own; and (2)
such control was used to commit a fraud or wrong which (3)
proximately caused plaintiff's injury."°
v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting Krivo Industrial Supply
Co. v. National Distillery & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973)). An even more
general formulation of the test used in some of the early cases dispensed, at least explicitly, with the
first prong. It provided that the corporate entity will be disregarded when to hold otherwise would
promote fraud, illegality or injustice or would defeat public policy. See, e.g., United States v.
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905).
102. Institute of Veterinary Pathology, Inc. v. California Health Laboratories, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 111, 119, 172 Cal. Rptr. 74,77-78 (1981); Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 854.
See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text (discussing the control prong in the three-part test).
103. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 855.
104. Downs, supra note 102, at 175-76; Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited
Liability Protection, 45 N.D. L. Rav. 363, 404-06 (1968).
105. Downs, supra note 93, at 190 (case law in Missouri demonstrates that the courts use a
three-prong test: (1) shareholder must exercise actual control over the actions of a corporation; (2)
the corporation must be used as a tool to promote fraud, injustice, or illegality; and (3) the misuse
of the corporate structure must in fact cause the harm to the person seeking to pierce the corporate
veil); 13A W. FLLrrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6222, at 68 (rev. pern. ed.
1984). "[T-he three elements involved are: (1) control of the subsidiary corporation, (2) fraud or
wrong of the parent corporation with respect to the creditor of the subsidiary or the person injured
by such subsidiary, and (3) unjust loss or injury to the creditor or the person injured; and the basis
for abrogating the normal immunity of stockholders in such cases is an abuse of the privilege to do
business in a corporate form, or in other words, an abuse upon the law." Id.
106. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 247 App. Div. 144, 157,287 N.Y.S. 62,76, (1936)
aftd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936). Lowendahl is a leading case adopting the three-prong test,
which was based on Frederick L Powell's examination of the early cases. See F. PoWEL1, PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARy CORPORATIONS (1931).
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a. Control or Instrumentality
To satisfy the essence of the fi'st prong, the plaintiff must
prove that the subsidiary or other subservient corporation was not
operated in a legitimate fashion, but instead functioned under the
domination and control of the parent corporation to serve the
parent's purposes."°7  Such domination must be something
substantially more than the control which would be exercised by
any majority shareholder, otherwise every corporation would be
automatically subject to having its veil pierced.10 8 The cases
typically cite a laundry list of some eleven factors which may
indicate that the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality."° Although
widely cited in support of piercing decisions, these factors have
107. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 16. See H. BALLENNE, supra note 85, § 136, at 313
(shareholder must control and manipulate the corporation for its own purposes); 2 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 95, § 43, at 472-73 (stating that "[fior the parent to be held liable for the subsidiary's acts
this control must be actual, participatory and total").
108. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 16. See 13A W. FLETCHER, supra note 105, § 6222,
at 68-69. According to Fletcher, "the exercise of some degree of supervision by a parent corporation
over its wholly owned subsidiary is not sufficient in itself to render the subsidiary the parent's
instrumentality or alter ego, where participation in the subsidiary's affairs does not amount to the
domination of day-to-day business decisions. In other words, a showing of complete domination of
the finances and business practices is necessary to sustain application of the instrumentality rule, and
mere proof of a parent corporation's potential to control or dominate its subsidiary is insufficient."
Id. See also Downs, supra note 93, at 192 (stating that in Missouri the type of control which is
required by a court as a prerequisite to piercing is actual and pervasive, not merely potential or
incomplete). But see Douglas & Shanks, supra note 87, at 204 (suggesting that if the parent has
reserved to itself the right of direct interference in the subsidiary's affairs, it is fair to hold it liable).
109. See, e.g., Steven v. Roscoe TurnerAeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157,161 (7th Cir. 1963);
Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F.2d 771,775 (5th Cir. 1975). These eleven circumstances
were taken from Powell and are as follows: (1) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital
stock of the subsidiary; (2) the parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers;
(3) the parent corporation finances the subsidiary; (4) the parent corporation subscribes to all of the
capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation; (5) the subsidiary has grossly
inadequate capital; (6) the parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the
subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation, or no
assets except the ones conveyed to it by the parent corporation; (8) in the papers of the parent
corporation or in the statements of the officers, the subsidiary is described as a department or division
of the parent corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is referred to as the parent
corporation's own; (9) the parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own; (10) the
directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary, but
take their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's interest; and (11) the formal legal
requirements of the subsidiary are not observed. F. POwVt.L, supra note 106, at 9.
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also been criticized as being conclusory"0 and an unpatterned
mingling of relevant and neutral factors, which have stymied
constructive analysis of the field.' Accordingly, it has been
suggested that it is preferable to consider these factors as indicia
which need not be present to pierce, but which may tend to
establish that the subsidiary is not really a separate and independent
entity but a mere instrumentality of the parent."
2
b. Improper Purpose or Wrong
As a general rule, the fact that one corporation holds
controlling stock ownership and voting power in another, and even
has directors and executive officers in common, will not alone be
sufficient to impose liability upon the dominant corporation." 3
The critical element of most piercing cases, explicitly or implicitly,
is the second prong of the piercing test: The controlling
shareholder's use of control for such an improper purpose that
equity requires the abrogation of limited immunity of the
corporation's shareholders."4 Wrongful exercise of this control
can be classified into three principal categories:" 5 violations of
110. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 17.
111. Dobbyn, A Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 KAN. L. REV.
185, 188 (1971).
112. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 17.
113. H. BAum4TiNE, supra note 85, § 137, at 314.
114. See, e.g., National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 248, 258 (W.D.
Mo. 1964) (refusing to pierce because although General Motors exercised total control over the
dealership corporation, these actions were taken for the proper business purpose of protecting its
investment), aff'd, 341 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1965); May Dep't Stores Co. v. Union Elec. light &
Power, 341 Mo. 299,310, 107 S.W.2d 41, 55 (1937). The court stated that '[mien have the right
to use legal forms which they believe to be helpful in accomplishing proper purposes. The question
should not be merely 'instrumentality,' but 'instrumentality for what purpose." Id. See also Krendl
& Krendl, supra note 86, at 18 (arguing that the use of a corporation as a mere instrumentality should
not give third parties a license to pursue a controlling shareholder unless some actual fraud or other
injurious act can be proven); 2 W. FI.ErcHER, supra note 95, § 41.20 at 413-14 (noting that the
corporate entity will not be disregarded where there is no fraud or wrong to be avoided).
115. 1 W. FL=rcHER, supra note 95, § 41.30, at 428, 430; Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86,
at 28. Krendl and Krendl note that another type of improper purpose or factor which courts often
mention is the failure of the corporation to engage in proper formalities (such as holding annual
meetings and keeping minutes of meetings). Id. at 28 n.98. Piercing on this ground has been
criticized as theoretically unsound. See, e.g., id.; Note, Liability ofa Parent Corporation, supra note
93, at 1126; Downs, supra note 93, at 176-77, 196 (in tort cases, failure of corporation to comply
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public policy including evasion of statutes;116
misrepresentation;117 and lack of economic substance.1 8
c. Relationship Between Injury and Defendant
Shareholder's Actions in Controlling Corporation
The third prong of the piercing rule, that the injury to the
plaintiff was caused by or related to1 9  the defendant
with usual formalities has nothing to do with a claimant's inability to collect a judgment).
116. See United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110, 119 (D. Vt. 1973)
(piercing the veil of some 40 subsidiaries, each of which owned a vessel, to enjoin the parent from
failing to comply with regulations intended to prevent oil spills), aff'd. 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
117. See My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614,614-15,233 N.E.2d
748,749-50 (1968) (where defendant's subsidiaries had purchased products from plaintiff, the court
held the parent liable for the claims against its subsidiaries upon a showing by plaintiff that the
affiliated corporations used a common name, operated out of the same office, and otherwise caused
confusion to the parties dealing with them as to the identity of the responsible corporation).
118. This category encompasses a number of types of wrongs to a corporation's creditors. A
principal example is undercapitalization, defined as setting up a new corporation with capital that is
clearly inadequate for the needs of the business. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364
P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961) (holding that gross undercapitalization by itself is
sufficient to disregard the corporate entity). Courts generally are more willing to pierce where
inadequate capitalization is a factor and the plaintiff is a tort creditor. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D.
154, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (stating that "[eourts will not tolerate arrangements which throw all
the risks on the public and which enable stockholders to reap profits while being insulated against
losses"). Another type of wrong in this category is siphoning of the assets of the corporation by the
controlling shareholder. See Ira S. Bushey, 363 F. Supp. at 112 (veil pierced where net profits of all
subsidiaries remitted to parents through dividends). See generally Note, Liability of a Parent
Corporation, supra note 93, at 1129 (discussing inadequate capitalization as the basis for liability).
A related type of wrong occurs when a corporation is deliberately operated unprofitably or is
established to do business exclusively with the dominant party, such that all of the profits of the
transaction are reaped by the dominant party. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp.
11, 17 (D. Minn. 1974), affid. in relevant part Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 534 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, Inc., 309
N.Y. 103, 107, 127 N.E. 2d 832, 834 (1955) (Van Vorhis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant
should be liable because it structured its subsidiary so that the subsidiary could not make a profit).
119. Krendl and Krendl argue that the Lowendahl formulation of the rule, which is put in terms
of "wrongful acts resulting from the parent's domination being the proximate cause of plaintiff's
loss" is too restrictive a rule. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 27 and n.93, 40-41 (citing cases
in which courts have pierced where it may not have been possible to prove that the defendant's
control directly caused plaintiff's injury, but in which "some knowing or cooperative effort between
the related parties which results in unjust injury to the plaintiff" was shown). But see H.
BALLENTINE, supra note 85, § 137, at 314 (stating that "[fin order to hold a parent corporation or
affiliate liable, special circumstances must be shown such as actual agency, estoppel, confusion of
affairs, or such abuse of control that an unjust loss or injury will be suffered by the complainant as
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shareholder's control of the corporation, is dispensed with in some
courts' formulations of the piercing test."' However,
commentators have argued that this element of the rule is both
morally and logically correct, in that this element supports the
strong policy of limited liability and offers some assurance that the
plaintiff has standing to complain, thereby discouraging frivolous
claims. 121
3. Flexible Application of the Piercing Rule
Notwithstanding the preceding review of the general two and
three prong rules, review of their application and the decisions in
which the piercing remedy has been granted reveals that the
"rules" are in fact not hard and fast ones." 2 Although the three-
part rule2 3 is solidly grounded in case law, the rule represents a
composite of factors considered by courts. 4 Some courts rely on
only one or two of the three factors."z Other courts seem to
require greater or lesser showings of control, wrongdoing or causal
a result of intervention or manipulation").
120. See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413,421-22 (5th Cir. 1980); Automotriz Del
Golfo De Cal. S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957). However, the
second element of the two-prong test is usually stated in terms such as "circumstances must indicate
that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice." I W. FLErCHER, supra note 95, § 41.30, at 428. This prong thus would seem to implicitly
incorporate the notion of some sort of causal relationship between the defendant controlling
shareholder and the plaintiff's injury, since presumably justice would not require abrogation of
limited corporate liability unless such a connection were established.
121. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 27-28.
122. See 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 95, § 41.30, at 430-32. "No precise formula is available
to predict when a court should disregard the corporate entity, each case being sui generis .... Some
courts have followed a liberal policy of applying the alter ego doctrine when the equities of the
situation call for its application rather than restricting the doctrine to the technical niceties depending
upon pleading and procedure." Id.
123. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (discussing the elements and origins of
the three-prong rule).
124. 1 W. FLErCHER, supra note 95, § 41.30, at 430 (stating that the appearance and the
importance of any single factor or combination of factors varies with the circumstances of each case).
125. See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts relied
on one or two of the three prongs). See also supra note 120 and accompanying text (decisions to
pierce which omit explicit findings of a causal relationship between defendant shareholder and
plaintiff's injury).
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relationship, depending on policy considerations.12 6 For example,
because the policy of limited liability may be intended to protect
only the ultimate investor, 2 7 a number of courts, at least
implicitly, relax evidentiary requirements under the general three-
part rule, or even apply a different test altogether, when the
defendant shareholder is a corporation rather than an
individual. 12
Decisions to pierce relying primarily, if not solely, on the first
prong of the test are not unprecedented. 29  Although this
approach has been criticized,'"t it appears to be sanctioned in at
least some formulations of the piercing rule.13 Policy
considerations may determine what degree of improper purpose by
the shareholder of the corporation will be required to satisfy the
second prong. 32 One commentator has observed that a very
substantial breach of some important public policy by use of the
subservient corporation may cause the veil to be pierced almost
without regard to other factors. 133
Considerations of policy and fairness are reflected in the
courts' greater willingness to abrogate corporate limited liability in
favor of a plaintiff seeking to hold a parent corporation, as
126. See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' consideration of
substantive policy in applying the piercing doctrine).
127. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (describing the rationale for limited liability
and criticisms of it when applied to shield parent corporations).
128. See infra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (discussing how courts tend to be more
willing to pierce the corporate veil when the defendant is a parent corporation as distinguished from
an individual, ultimate investor).
129. See Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573-75 (rex. 1975); Chatterley v.
Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88,485 P.2d 667, 670 (1971). See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note
95, §43, at 472 (suggesting that satisfaction of the control prong, for example, by a finding that a
corporation is a mere instrumentality, is sufficient grounds for disregarding the corporate entity).
130. See Downs, supra note 93, at 180 (arguing that -[i]t is difficult to accommodate the
judicial focus on domination and control by one or a few shareholders with the legislative approval
of such entities").
131. See I W. FLETCHER, supra note 95, § 43, at 472 (stating that "[a] very numerous and
growing class of cases disregard the corporate entity where it is so organized and controlled, and its
affairs are so conducted, that it is merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation"); H. HEN & J. ALExANDER, supra note 95, § 147, at 353 (even absent illegitimate
purposes, if business is not conducted on a corporate rather than a personal basis, courts have
disregarded the corporate privilege of limited liability of closely-held corporations).
132. See Hamilton, supra note 93, at 1002, 1007-08; Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 43.
133. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 47.
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distinguished from an individual controlling shareholder, liable for
an obligation." 4 Here the policy considerations are not limited to
those of the underlying substantive law, but rather relate primarily
to the specific purpose for which the corporation was formed, as
well as to the general purposes for which the privilege of limited
liability was originally created.135 Courts may recognize that there
is less economic or other policy justification for providing multiple-
limited liablity insulation to a corporation that wishes to segregate
high risk activities in a subsidiary than there would be for an
individual shareholder or a group of individuals who wished to take
advantage of the corporate limited liability feature. 136 While it
may be economically necessary to provide limited liability as an
inducement to obtain needed investment capital for new
corporations, it is not clear that limited liability for subsidiary
corporations is necessary to encourage existing corporations to
enter into new and perhaps riskier businesses.'37 Moreover,
allowing creditors to reach the assets of parent corporations does
not create unlimited liability for any individual.138 Courts piercing
on this basis may be viewing the intertwined affairs of the separate
corporations as evidence that the corporations constitute a single
economic enterprise, the combined assets of which should be made
available to satisfy creditors of each of the working units. 139
Thus, the courts tend not to apply the three-part piercing rule,
or any variation thereon, in a rigid or consistent manner. Satisfying
the three-part test is largely a question of fact and not of law."4
In addition, policy considerations, relating to both the substantive
134. See Easterbrook & Fishel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 89,
110-11 (1985); Hamilton, supra note 93, at 992; Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 43-44.
135. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for the doctrine
of limited liability).
136. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 86, at 44.
137. Id.
138. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 134, at 111.
139. See Note, Liability ofa Parent Corporation, supra note 93, at 1131. See generally Berle,
The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 313 (1947) (arguing that where the corporate
entity is challenged, its existence, extent and consequences may be determined by the actual existence
and extent and operations of the underlying enteiprise, which by these very qualities acquires an
entity of its own).
140. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 855.
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underlying law and the nature and objectives of the corporate
entity, figure prominently in the courts' applications of the
equitable remedy of abrogating the privilege of limited corporate
liability.14
1
C. Standards for Piercing the Veil in Federal Question Litigation
The uncertainty as to the standards for parent corporation
liability is compounded by a split of authority as to whether state
law or federal common law should apply in federal question cases
such as those involving CERCLA.141 Moreover, even among
courts deciding to apply federal common law, it is often unclear
what rule of decision will be applied in any given case.1
43
Federal courts are authorized to formulate federal common law
in cases arising under federal statutes.'" When a federal statute
includes guidelines for disregarding the corporate entity, courts
must enforce the federal guidelines in lieu of conflicting state
standards. 145 On the other hand, if the statute contains no express
standard and the legislative history is silent on the point, courts
must choose between adopting state law or federal common
141. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' consideration of
policy in applying the piercing remedy).
142. See infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text (discussing the factors courts consider in
determining whether to apply state law).
143. See infra notes 150-160 and accompanying text (discussing factors the courts consider in
adopting a rule of decision once a decision has been made to apply federal common law in a piercing
inquiry).
144. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (federal law governs
questions involving the rights of the federal government under federal programs); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (federal courts may develop federal common law
to govern matters affecting the rights of the federal government). See generally Field, Sources of the
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L RLv. 881 (1986); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-
-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L Rnv. 383, 405-22 (1964); Mishkin, The
Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L REV. 797 (1957).
145. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 364-65 (1944) (refusing to apply Delaware alter ego
law which would have insulated shareholders and instead piercing the veil of a corporation on the
basis of federal statutory guidelines). See Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 856.
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law. 146 If state law does not contradict the federal statute at issue,
the federal courts will often apply the state law as the rule of
decision.147 Short of outright conflict between federal and state
law, other courts balance the extent to which federal interests are
better served by adopting a uniform federal rule against the relative
strength of the state interest in having its rule applied.14 ' Factors
especially relevant in weighing state and federal interests include:
(1) Whether application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of a federal program; (2) the need for national
uniformity; and (3) the extent to which a federal rule would disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law.
149
Once a court has determined that a uniform federal rule of
decision should be applied, the content of that rule must be
ascertained. The federal common law formulation of the veil-
piercing doctrine is at least as amorphous as state law. 5 ° Many
federal courts simply apply the two-prong state common law
146. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 857-58. Those courts which routinely apply
state law do so surmising that Congress presumably was aware of state law standards and could have
preempted them. Id. This approach has been criticized on the grounds that such "'silene ... in
federal legislation is no reason for limiting the reach of federal law [because] the inevitable
incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic
responsibility of the federal courts." United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,593
(1973). If federal courts fail to exercise this responsibility, application of federal law would vary
among forums states. Note, AlterEgo Doctrine, supra note 94, at 858. "To prevent this subordination
of federal law, most federal courts have not deferred to state law in the absence 6f express statutory
standards; instead they have resolved corporate veil questions under federal common law." Id.
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) (Rules of Decision Act); Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra
note 94, at 859.
148. Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980); Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1208 (E.D. Cal. 1978). The presumption
under federal common law that state law should apply is particularly strong in fields traditionally
regulated by the states, such as corporate law. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 862.
"According to the 'internal affairs doctrine' of corporate law, a corporation's internal affairs should
be regulated by the law of the state of incorporation, but external affairs may be governed by other
law, such as that of the forum." Id.
149. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979). See Comment,
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Federal Courts: Is Circumvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAc. .J.
1245, 1249-50 (1982) (identifying additional factors considered by the courts).
150. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 859-60.
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doctrine: unity of interest and injustice in the particular
situation."' Other courts have used an even more general
formulation of the piercing rule allowing for the disregard of the
corporate entity in the interests of public convenience, fairness and
equity.1 52
Many courts and commentators have criticized the routine
adoption by federal courts of the general state common law
piercing rule because state law may be inadequate to enforce
specific policies underlying federal statutes.'53 Accordingly, a
number of courts have altered the traditional corporate law test by
modifying the control/unity of interest and the improper
purpose/inequity prongs to accommodate statutory objectives.'54
The first prong of the test is modified to reflect the type and
degree of control over a corporate defendant required by the policy
of the applicable federal statute.155 To prevent interference with
federal statutory objectives, courts have found a lesser degree of
control sufficient to disregard the corporate entity than would
typically be required under the traditional doctrine. For example,
courts have held the control prong to have been satisfied where
control by the parent was exercised indirectly even in the absence
of ownership.156 Similarly, control has been presumed where the
151. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,684-87 (4th
Cir. 1976); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634,
637-38 (8th Cir. 1975); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935,939-40 (10th Cir. 1975);
Delchamps, Inc. v. Borkin, 429 F.2d 417,418-19 (5th Cir. 1970); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267,272-
75 (3d Cir. 1967). See also supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing the two-pronged
piercing test).
152. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939); Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Assn, 247 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1918); Capital Tel.
Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
153. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979); Capital Tel. Co.
v. Fed. Communications Common., 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bowater S.S. Co. v.
Patterson, 303 F.2d 369, 372 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 860 (1962). See also Note, Alter
Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 864-65.
154. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424 (N.D. Ga. 1978);
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106,1153-55 (1975), aff'd me. sub nom. Turner v. FTC 580
F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 866.
155. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 866.
156. United States v. Cartwright, 632 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1980); Establissement Tomis
v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1355, 1366 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Note, Alter Ego
Doctrine, supra note 94, at 866-67.
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parent knew of a federal violation and could have prevented it, or
where the parent benefited from the violation.
157
More significant is the refinement to the second and third
prongs. Instead of requiring deliberate use of the corporate form for
an improper purpose which caused the plaintiff injury, 158 these
prongs are satisfied where recognizing the corporate entity would
"defeat a legislative policy, whether that was the aim or only the
result of the arrangement.' 159 In determining whether to
disregard the corporate entity under this approach, "federal courts
will look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to determine
whether the statute places importance on the corporate form, an
inquiry that usually gives less respect to the corporate form than
does the strict common law alter ego doctrine."160
IV. PARENT CORPORATION LABUTY UNDER CERCLA:
THE CASE LAW
In view of the vague language and ambiguous legislative
history of CERCLA's liability provisions and the similarly
nebulous formulations and applications of the piercing doctrine
under state corporate and federal common law, it is not surprising
that the courts' consideration of parent corporation liability under
157. Cody v. Community Loan Corp. of Richmond County, 606 F.2d 499,506 n.13 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980); P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 427 F.2d
261, 270 (6th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note
at 867.
158. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text (discussing the second and third prongs
of the traditional state common law piercing test).
159. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349,363 (1944). The Court refused to apply the Delaware
test for piercing the corporate veil because "no state may endow its corporate creatures with the
power to place themselves above the Congress of the United States and defeat the federal policy.
.. which Congress has announced." Id. at 365. See also United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88-89
(3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 421,424-25 (D.
Mass. 1977) (mere inability of corporations to pay warrants piercing, notwithstanding the absence
of fault or inequities). See generally Comment, supra note 149, at 1254-55, 1257-62, 1266-69
(arguing that cases support the proposition that the corporate entity may be disregarded when an act
by the corporation serves to undermine a substantial federal legislative purpose regardless of the
existence of any wrongful conduct).
160. Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215,221 (Ist Cir. 1981) (citing Schenley Distillers Corp.
v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946), FMnk v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 62 (1929)).
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CERCLA has produced an inconsistent body of case law.'
Some courts, emboldened by expansive interpretations of the term
"owner or operator," have found parent corporations directly liable
as owners or operators, obviating application of the piercing
doctrine per se. 62 Other courts, faced with claims against parent
corporations, have viewed the issue as one of whether the corporate
privilege of limited liability should be abrogated.'63 Courts which
have applied the piercing doctrine, as distinguished from those
finding direct liability under the statute, have used widely varying
approaches and criteria in their piercing decisions. Some have
fashioned a federal rule of decision based on CERCLA's statutory
objectives and policy framework.' Others have utilized either
general federal common law or precedent within the circuit, which
is essentially indistinguishable from traditional state corporate law
doctrines./ca
The case law on this issue is very recent, even in the context
of CERCLA's relatively short legislative life. The earliest decision
directly confronting parent corporation liability, Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co.,'" was decided in 1986.167 This part reviews the case
161. As one court has observed, CERCLA's "inartful draftsmanship" makes the court's job
of ascertaining the law's meaning "tougher and increases the chances that courts around the country
will adopt differing approaches to major, national anti-pollution legislation." In re Acushnet River
& New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 26 n.2 (D. Mass.
1987).
162. See infra notes 168-224 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding parent
corporations directly liable as owners or operators).
163. See infra notes 225-270 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the courts have
applied the piercing doctrine).
164. See infra notes 231-242 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the courts have
crafted a federal rule of decision based on CERCLA's goals).
165. See infra notes 243-270 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the courts have
applied traditional piercing doctrines without modification).
166. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
167. Prior to Bunker Hill, however, at least two courts indirectly confronted the issue of parent
corporation liability under CERCLA by addressing the question of whether the court had personal
jurisdiction over the parents of responsible party subsidiaries: Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc.,
616 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that the mere fact that a subsidiary does business
within the state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is the sole
owner, because there is a presumption of corporate separateness that exists unless, from evidence
presented, the parent so controls activities of subsidiary that the latter is only a shell for the former);
and United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 131-32 (E.D. Mo. 1985). Despite exercise of control by
parent over subsidiary, the Bliss court declined to pierce the corporate veil to establish jurisdiction
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law, considering in Section A the reasoning used by courts finding
parent corporations directly liable under the statute and then, in
Section B, examining the varying paths trial courts have taken in
applying the piercing doctrine.
A. Finding Parent Corporations Directly Liable Under CERCLA:
Bunker Hill and its Progeny
In Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., Gulf Resources and Chemical
Corporation (Gulf), the parent corporation of Bunker Hill Company
(Bunker Hill), sought to interpose the corporate veil in a CERCLA
action brought by the state of Idaho for recovery of mining waste
site cleanup costs and associated natural resource damages.' By
piercing the corporate veil, the district court found personal
jurisidiction over Gulf, concluding that Gulf and Bunker Hill were
so intertwined, and Gulf so controlled the management and
operations of Bunker Hill, that subjecting Gulf to the court's
jurisdiction would not offend due process."6 To support its
finding, the court pointed to a number of facts: In matters dealing
with pollution problems, Bunker Hill was not able to spend more
than $500 without Gulf's approval; Bunker Hill's authorized capital
was a mere $1,100; Gulf received $27 million in dividends from
Bunker Hill after the company's merger; and Gulf could overrule
a transaction or decision regarding management made by Bunker
Hill. 170
In deciding whether Gulf could be held liable for cleanup costs
at its subsidiary's facility, the court first stated that the same
over the parent because the parent corporation neither ignored corporate separateness nor delved into
the day-to-day operations of its subsidiary). Id. Cf. infra notes 169-170 and accompanying text
(discussing the Bunker Hill court's use of a similar analysis to pierce the corporate veil first to
establish personal jurisdiction over the parent and then as one basis of holding the parent liable for
the response costs incurred due to its subsidiary's activities).
168. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 671.
169. id. at 670.
170. Id. The court also cited the following factors as supporting its exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Gulf: (I) Gulf at times controlled a majority of Bunker Hill's board of directors; (2)
Bunker Hill's tax returns were consolidated with Gulf's; and (3) all capital expenditures were to be
approved by Gulf. Id.
887
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
factors and analysis which established the court's jurisdiction over
Gulf supported a conclusion that Gulf was an owner or operator for
purposes of CERCLA liability.' 7' However, the court did not
support its holding solely or even principally on the piercing-based
analysis. 72 Instead, it cited the reasoning of United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. 7' as the basis for
a new test to determine when a parent corporation becomes an
owner or operator with respect to its subsidiary's facilities, thereby
incurring liability under CERCLA. 74
One foundation of the Northeastern Pharmaceutical trial court
decision, which held two corporate officers and major shareholders
personally and directly liable,1 75  was the court's broad
construction of the term "owner or operator." 76  The
Northeastern Pharmaceutical court supported its liberal
interpretation by finding congressional intent that "the persons who
bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal also bear the costs of
cleaning it up.', 177 The court found that the statute "literally"
provided that "a person who owns an interest in a facility and is
actively participating in its management can be held liable for the
171. Id.
172. See id. at 671-72.
173. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
174. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 671-72.
175. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 847-50. It should be noted that although
the trial court found two officer-shareholders of Northeastern Pharmaceutical liable as owners and
operators, on appeal this basis for holding them liable was rejected. United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986). CERCLA liability attaches
to owners or operators of facilities at which hazardous wastes are disposed of, not the facilities
generating the waste, such as the Northeastern Pharmaceutical plant. Id. One of the two officer-
shareholders had also been found liable by the trial court as a generator, this finding was affirmed
on appeal. Id. at 743-44. Bunker Hill, which incorporated the Northeastern Pharmaceutical trial
court's definition of "owner or operator" was decided after the trial court's decision was issued but
prior to the appellate court's reversal. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (decided January 31, 1984); Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp.
at 666 (decided May 22, 1986); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810
F.2d 726, 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (decided December 31, 1986). The appellate court did not, however,
review the trial court's definition of "owner or operator."
176. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.Supp. 823, 848-49
(W.D. Mo. 1984). See also supra note 59 and accompanying text (statutory definition of "owner or
operator").
177. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 848.
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disposal of hazardous waste." 7 8  The Northeastern
Pharmaceutical court also found prior judicial interpretations of
"'owner or operator" under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act persuasive.179 Under this construction, an owner or operator
is one who has the capacity to control pollution generating
activities and to prevent and abate damage from those
activities. i0
After adopting the Northeastern Pharmaceutical court's
definition of owner-operator as the test for determining when a
178. Id. at 848. Northeastern Pharmaceutical was the first of many cases construing the
exemption from liability, in the definition of "owner or operator," for a secured lender that does not
participate in management, as giving rise to an inference that an individual who owns stock in a
corporation and who actively participates in its management or, in some cases, merely has the
capacity to control corporate operations can be held liable as an owner or operator. See New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (active participation standard); Quadion
Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (authority to control and responsibility
actually undertaken are among factors considered in ascertaining liability ofshareholder); Kelley ex
rel Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 (W.D.
Mich. 1989) (capacity to control along with responsibility undertaken as a means of determining a
shareholder's ability to prevent disposal problem); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 190 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (active participation); United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip
op. at 4-5 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1985) (active participation); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984) (control or authority over activities of
a facility). See also supra note 59 (definition of "owner or operator").
179. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49. The Northeastern Pharmaceutical
court adopted the interpretation of "'owner or operator" given by the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972):
The owner-operator of a vessel or a vacility [sic] has the capacity to make
timely discovery of oil discharges. The owner-operator has the capacity to
direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms causing the
pollution. The owner-operator has the capacity to prevent and abate damage.
Id. at 1127. Accord, Apex Oil Company v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 1976). See
33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6 ) (1982) (definition of "'owner or operator" under Federal Water Pollution
Control Act).
180. See supra note 179 (stating the judicial construction of "owner or operator" under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act [hereinafter FWPCA]). The Northeastern Pharmaceuticalcourt's
adoption of the Mobil Oil definition of owner or operator has been criticized on the basis of the
different purposes of the operative provisions in FWPCA and CERCLA, to which the definition was
applied. Comment, Corporate Officer Liability, supra note 64, at 962-63. Specifically, it is argued
that the broad construction given to "owner or operator" by the Mobil and Apex courts "operated
to eliminate incongruities within the statute," whereas the issue of individual liability of corporate
officers presented in Northeastern Pharmaceutical was not one of "resolving inconsistency in
statutory language but rather of defining the scope of terms where sources of information upon which
to base that scope are limited." Id.
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parent corporation becomes an owner or operator with respect to a
subsidiary's facilities,181 the Bunker Hill court found Gulf liable
as an owner or operator, noting that to hold otherwise would allow
the corporate veil to frustrate congressional intent. 182 In support
of this holding, the court noted that Gulf had the capacity to
control hazardous waste disposal and releases and the capacity, if
not total authority, to take steps to prevent and abate damage
caused by such releases at Bunker Hill's facility. 183 The court
also buttressed its holding by reiterating the factors relied upon to
find personal jurisdiction over Gulf,184 juxtaposing Bunker Hill's
limited capitalization against Gulf's receipt of $27 million in
dividends from Gulf's wholly owned subsidiary.185 The court
issued its own caveat regarding the use of the test, observing that
"scare must be taken so that 'normal' activities of a parent with
respect to its subsidiary do not automatically warrant finding the
parent an owner or operator. ' 186
By incorporating a broad definition of owner or operator, the
Bunker Hill court found a statutory basis for holding parent
corporations liable without formally piercing the corporate veil, if
the parent corporation has the "capacity to control" the
subsidiary's waste disposal practices. 1 7 Although the facts of the
case arguably provide the basis for piercing under either a federal
common law test tailored to the policies of CERCLA"88 or a
traditional corporate law test, 8 9 the court, perhaps averse to
181. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text (discussing the court's findings in support
of its decision to pierce the veil to find personal jurisdiction over Gulf).
185. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' approach to
crafting piercing tests in consideration of federal statutory objectives). See also Bunker Hill, 635 F.
Supp. at 672 (citing the intent of Congress that the persons who bore the fruits of hazardous waste
disposal also bear the costs of cleaning it up).
189. See supra notes 101-141 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional two- and three-
prong piercing test). See also Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 670-72 (citing factors indicating that
Bunker Hill functioned under the domination, and for the purposes of, Gulf; suggesting that Bunker
Hill was undercapitalized; and noting that Gulf was aware of Bunker Hill's waste disposal and toxic
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abrogating limited shareholder liability under state law when not
absolutely necessary, 19° chose instead to base its finding of
liability upon its interpretation of the federal statute's textual
provisions. 19
At least four courts have followed the approach taken in
Bunker Hill, albeit with some variations."9 In United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., a the court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
refused to dismiss an action against the parent corporation of a
former operator of a Superfund site. 94 In an attempt to expedite
disposition of the case, the court endorsed several alternative
theories of liability set forth by the government,195 including
direct statutory liability 96 as well as liability derived from
piercing the corporate veil. 197
Two somewhat different theories of direct liability were
adopted in Nicolet. The court first approved the Bunker Hill
approach, which the court characterized as predicating liability
upon familiarity with and capacity to control the subsidiary's waste
releases and had the capacity to prevent and abate the damage, thereby arguably providing a basis
to find a sufficient relationship between Gulf, the response costs incurred by the government, and the
natural resource damages).
190. See I W. FLErcHES, supra note 95, § 41.30, at 429 (stating that the "power to pierce the
corporate veil, though, is to be exercised 'reluctantly' and 'cautiously*').
191. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672.
192. See infra notes 193-224 and accompanying text. Although a fifth court cited generally to
Bunker Hill, the opinion failed to articulate the basis for its holding a parent corporation, along with
the executive officers of a family of closely held corporations, liable on the government's motion for
summary judgment. See Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822,825,831 (D.Vt. 1988). The Staco
court's only statement directly supporting parent corporation liability is that "[t]he defendant Chase
Instruments Corporation owns all the stock of Staco." Id. at 831. This seems to imply that mere
ownership is sufficient for liability to attach absent any participation, let alone pervasive control.
However, the facts of the case, although not explicitly marshalled by the court in support of this
particular holding, at least arguably provide the basis to find that Chase, through its executive
officers, participated in the control and management of Staco. See id.
193. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (F.D. Pa. 1989).
194. Id. at 1200.
195. Id. at 1200-05.
196. Id. at 1202-05. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
alternative rules for holding parent directly liable as owner or operator). The court also ruled that the
parent corporation, T & N, could be held liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator on the
grounds that it held the mortgage on the site of the subsidiary only if T & N participated in the
managerial and operational aspects of the site. Id. at 1205.
197. Id. at 1200-02. See infra notes 231-235 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
proposed federal rule of decision for piercing to hold a parent corporation liable under CERCLA).
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disposal practices, and the parent's benefit from those
practices.198 The court also ruled that T & N, the parent
corporation, could be held liable as an owner or operator under
CERCLA if T & N directly participated in management of the
subsidiary.1 Citing cases holding individual shareholders liable
if the shareholders actively participate in the management of a
corporation,2' the court noted that there is no basis under
CERCLA to distinguish between the liability of an individual
stockholder who actively participates in the management of a
corporation and a corporate stockholder that so participates: both
are included within the definition of "person" under
CERCLA. °1 Accordingly, the court held that if an individual
stockholder can be liable under CERCLA for the corporation's
disposal of toxic waste, a corporation which holds stock in another
corporation and actively participates in the other corporation's
management can be held liable for cleanup costs incurred as a
result of that corporation's disposal.2"
Similarly, in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.2 °3 the First
Circuit adopted the "active participation" standard to affirm the
trial court's holding the parent corporation, Kayser-Roth, directly
liable as an operator for the costs of cleaning up groundwater
contamination caused by a spill of a hazardous waste at Kayser-
Roth's subsidiary's textile manufacturing operation. 2°4 Although
the trial court had also found the parent liable derivatively as an
owner after piercing the corporate veil, the First Circuit, perhaps
sharing the Bunker Hill court's apparent reluctance to exercise its
198. Id. at 1203-04.
199. Id. at 1203.
200. Id. at 1203. The court cited United Stares v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 4-5 (F.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (courts have generally concluded that the exemption from liability (found in
Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)) implies that an individual who owns
stock in a corporation and who actively participates in its management can be held liable for cleanup
costs incurred as a result of improper disposal by the corporation). See supra note 178 and
accompanying text (citing cases construing this exemption). See also infra note 366 and
accompanying text (discussing cases finding individual shareholders liable as owners or operators).
201. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1203. See supra note 53 (definition of person under CERCLA).
202. Id.
203. 910 F.2d 24(lst Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
204. Id. at 27-28.
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equitable discretion to abrogate state corporate immunity, did not
affirm or even consider this alternative basis of liability. 5 The
First Circuit concluded that Congress had not intended to shield
persons who are actively involved in the activities of a waste
facility from liability as operators, regardless of corporate
status.2
06
In reviewing the trial court's holding that Kayser-Roth was an
operator of its subsidiary's facility, the First Circuit first cautioned
that for a parent to be considered an operator "requires more than
merely complete ownership and the concomitant general authority
or ability to control that comes with ownership" and at a minimum
requires active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary.0 7
The Court of Appeals found the record of Kayser-Roth's
involvement in the activities of its subsidiary, Stamina Mills, to be
more than sufficient to support liability as an operator. 20 8 The
trial court had concluded that Kayser-Roth had exercised pervasive
control over Stamina Mills, °9 citing the parent's total control
over the subsidiary's finances, as indicated by restrictions on
Stamina's budget, capital expenditures and real estate
transactions. 21 Moreover, the trial court pointed to Kayser-Roth's
205. Id. at 25.
206. Id. at 26-27. The court distinguished between liability as an "owner" and as an
"operator." Id. See supra note 59 (definition of "owner or operator"). The court concluded that by
using the conjunctive "or" in identifying the category of responsible parties of "owner or operator,"
Congress "implied that a person who is an operator is not protected from liability by the legal
structure of ownership." Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26. The court's focus on whether Kayser-Roth's
active participation in its subsidiary's affairs rose to the level of operating the subsidiary's facility
distinguished the decision from that in Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1990) cerm denied, 11 S.Ct. 957 (1991). According to the Kayser-Roth court, the Joslyn
court was concerned with owner rather than operator liability. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27. Cf infra
notes 259-270 and accompanying text (discussion of the Joslyn conclusion that Congress did not
intend that a parent corporation be held directly liable as an "owner or operator").
207. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27.
208. Id. at 28.
209. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15,22-23 (D.R.I. 1989). After initially
observing the distinction cited in Nicolet between the indicia of ownership/active participation and
the capacity to control theories of direct liability, the trial court then confined its inquiry to the extent
of the parent's exercise of control over the management and operations of the subsidiary. Id. at 22.
210. Id. The court also found significant the fact that Kayser-Roth had placed its personnel in
almost all Stamina Mills' director and officer positions, "as a means of totally ensuring that Kayser-
Roth's corporate policy was exactly implemented and precisely carried out." Id.
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directive that the subsidiary's contacts with governmental agencies,
including those dealing with environmental matters, be funneled
directly through Kayser-Roth.211 Thus, because Kayser-Roth
exercised practically total control over the operations of its
subsidiary, the Court of Appeals deemed Kayser-Roth an operator
under CERCLA's liability scheme.212
In denying a defendant parent corporation's motion for
summary judgment, the court for the Northern District of Illinois
in Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp.2 3 not
only held that the plaintiff Rockwell had identified sufficient
evidence to support a finding that LU, the parent corporation, was
an operator within the meaning of CERCLA, but also adopted a
somewhat more conservative version of the Bunker Hill test.
214
The court cited conflicting language in Northeastern
Pharmaceutical as to the nature of the "control" or
"participation" test: A standard of active participation in the
management is said to stem from a "literal reading" of
CERCLA, 2 5  but the Northeastern Pharmaceutical court also
suggested that defendant's capacity to control is sufficient to hold
the defendant liable.216 The Rockwell court declined to adopt the
latter view, ruling that mere ability to exercise control as a result
of the financial relationship of the parties is insufficient for liability
to attach, and that actual exercise of control is essential to hold
shareholders liable.2 7  The court then cited various factors
211. Id. Although generally eschewing the "capacity to control" theory of liability as set forth
in Bunker Hill, the trial court in Kayser-Roth did point to the parent corporation's power to control
the release or threat of release of the hazardous substance, and the parent's ultimate ability to prevent
and abate damage. Id. The court also noted that when Stamina Mills was sued for an illegal waste
water discharge, the fial decision on settlement was made by Kayser-Roth's directors. Id. at 23.
212. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24,27-28 (1st Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 11
S. Ct. 957 (1991).
213. 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. 111. 1988).
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
216. Id. (citing Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 849).
217. Id. The court relied on Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp.
651,656-57 (N.D. IM. 1988) (holding that plaintiff's evidence that the defendant built the facility and
had at most a right of access to the facility was insufficient to establish operator liability, and stating
that "only those who actually operate or exercise control over the facility that creates an
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demonstrating sufficient management participation and indicia of
the actual exercise of control by the defendant IU Corporation to
warrant a finding that IU was an operator under CERCLA.21 8 IU
hired or approved the hiring of certain corporate officers of the
subsidiaries that owned and operated the facility, some of whom
were also IU officers.219 With respect to operations related to
CERCLA liability, IU auditors suggested changes in certain
procedures that directly affected the disposal of hazardous
substances, and IU personnel reviewed requests by the subsidiary
to purchase environmental protection equipment.220 The court
found this involvement to provide a sufficient basis for IU's direct
liability as an operator."
Thus, based on a broad construction of the term "owner or
operator," a number of federal district courts, and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, have fashioned a variable test for
holding a parent corporation directly liable under CERCLA for the
response costs incurred at sites operated by the parent's
subsidiary.222 If the parent exercises actual control over the
subsidiary's operations, particularly the subsidiary's waste disposal
or environmental management practices,223 or if the parent merely
environmental risk can be held liable under CERCLA for the costs of reducing that risk").
218. Rockwell, 702 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. See also Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 20,578
(D. Colo. April 29, 1987). Although citing the Northeastern Pharmaceutical -capacity to control"
test for parent corporation liability, Idarado actually applies an "active participation" standard to
hold a responsible party's parent corporation and an affiliated -sister" corporation liable as "'owner
and operator" and 'operator," respectively. Id. at 20,578-79. In concluding that the parent exercised
pervasive control, the court noted that the parent controlled its subsidiary's recruitment and
reimbursement policies, negotiated and entered into contracts on Idarado's behalf, and participated
in efforts to ameliorate the subsidiary's facility's environmental problems. Id. The sister corporation,
formed for the purpose of providing the parent's subsidiaries with a steady supply of management
and other employees, was held liable as an operator because the court found that the sister
corporation was a defacto manager, involved directly in the day-to-day operations of the mine. Id.
at 20,579.
222. See supra notes 168-221 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 199-202,204,206-212,214-221 and accompanying text (discussing the
trial courts' rulings in Nicolet, Rockwell and Idarado and the First Circuit's holding in Kayser-Roth).
895
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
has the capacity to control such activities, 4 the parent may be
liable without a court formally piercing~the subsidiary's veil.
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil to Hold Parent Corporations
Liable Under CERCLA
The trial courts in both Nicolet and Kayser-Roth not only held
parent corporations directly liable under CERCLA as owners or
operatorsp - but, in alternative rulings, endorsed piercing the
corporate veil on the basis of a federal rule of decision designed to
reflect CERCLA's policies in order to attach liability derivatively
to the parent corporation of a responsible party. 6 In contrast,
courts in two other cases, In re Acushnet River and New Bedford
Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution227 and Joslyn
Corporation v. T.L. James & Co.," 8 declined to fashion a
specific federal rule of decision for piercing the corporate veil
under CERCLA based on the Act's policies. 9 Instead, these
courts relied upon generalized federal substantive law and Fifth
Circuit precedent, respectively, both of which are interchangeable
with traditional state corporate law doctrine, as the basis to
abrogate limited corporate liability.230
In considering the federal government's claim that T & N, the
parent corporation in Nicolet, should be held liable under both
Pennsylvania law and a proposed federal rule of decision for
disregarding the corporate entity, the court first determined that
224. See supra notes 174-191, 198, 209 and accompanying text (discussing the trial courts'
rulings in Bunker Hill, Nicolet, and Kayser-Roth).
225. See supra notes 198-202, 209-211 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet and
Kayser-Roth trial courts' rulings that parent corporations could be directly liable as owners or
operators).
226. See infra notes 231-242 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet and Kayser-Roth
trial courts' formulations of a federal rule of decision to govern piercing inquiries under CERCLA).
227. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
228. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
229. See infra notes 247-252, 266-268 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the
Acushnet River and Joslyn courts in refusing to relax or substantially alter the traditional test in
applications under CERCLA).
230. See infra notes 250-258,268-270 and accompanying text (discussing the Acushnet River
and Joslyn courts' application of traditional piercing doctrine).
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federal law controlled.23' Based on the federal common law
principle that the corporate entity should be disregarded "when the
court must prevent fraud, illegality or injustice, or when recognition
of the corporate entity would defeat public policy" the court
formulated a federal rule of decision applicable in CERCLA cases
to determine when a corporate veil can be pierced. 2 The
separate corporate existence of a corporation may be disregarded
if the corporation has a substantial ownership interest in a
subsidiary that is a potentially responsible party under CERCLA
and if the corporation controls the subsidiary's management and
operations." 3 The court's standard begs the question of what
231. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (F.D. Pa. 1989). Citing well-
established precedent that courts should fashion uniform federal rules of decision when a federal
statute is silent as to the choice of law to be applied but overriding federal interests exist, the court
found that the nature of the Superfund program required national uniformity, the application of state
law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program, and the application of federal laws
would not disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. Id. at 1201-02 (citing the rule
of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979)). The court also pointed to the
Third Circuit's finding in Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d
Cir. 1988), that CERCLA's meager legislative history indicates that Congress expected the courts to
develop a federal common law to supplement the statute. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1201. In support
of its conclusion that a uniform rule is necessary, the court reasoned that federal environmental
protection programs are particularly demanding of national uniformity, and that Congress intended
that neither the government's ability to fund the cleanup of hazardous waste sites nor liability under
CERCLA should depend on the particular state in which a defendant happens to reside. Id. at 1201-
02 (citing In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675
F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987)). The court did not, however, cite any support for the bare
conclusions that a federal rule of decision would not disrupt commercial relations predicated on state
law and that the application of state laws would frustrate CERCLA objectives. Id. at 1202. Indeed,
the latter finding seems to conflict with the court's observation that there would likely be no practical
difference whether the court looked to federal law or Pennsylvania law to decide the alter ego issue.
See id. at 1201. Cf. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31 (explaining that a uniform federal rule would
not frustrate commercial relationships properly predicated on state law, since the issue of liability
under CERCLA involves the rights of third parties external to the corporation, and that shareholders
are entitled to rely on the law of the incorporating state -solely with regard to the internal affairs of
the corporation").
232. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202 (quoting American Bell Inc. v. Fed'n of Tel. Workers, 736
F.2d 879, 886 (3d Cir. 1984)).
233. Id. The court observed that "'[s]uch a rule was adopted by the district court in State of
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., which held that 'a parent's involvement in the management and operations'
of [a] subsidiary, which was subject to personal jurisdiction as a result, supported the conclusion that
the parent 'was an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA liability.' Id. However, other courts
and commentators have viewed the Bunker Hill hIding as resting principally, if not exclusively, on
direct liability under the court's interpretation of owner or operator, not on a piercing theory. See
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989); McMahon & Moertl, The
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degree of control is sufficient to find the parent liable. The court
did, however, find that T & N would be liable under its rule of
decision if the government could prove that T & N, as the
responsible party's majority shareholder: (1) actively participated
in the management of the subsidiary's operations when asbestos
was being disposed of at the site; (2) was familiar with the
subsidiary's waste disposal practices and had the capacity to
control the disposal and resultant releases and to abate damages
from such releases; and (3) had benefitted from the subsidiary's
waste disposal practices.' Thus, the federal rule of decision for
piercing in CERCLA actions adopted by the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania appears to be the operational equivalent of the First
Circuit's test in Kayser-Roth to find direct liability as an operator
under CERCLA without piercing.235
Like the Nicolet court, the trial court in Kayser-Roth found the
parent not only directly liable, as an owner or operator under
CERCLA, but also derivatively liable under an alternative theory
based on piercing the subsidiary's corporate veil.236 Unlike the
court in Nicolet, however, the Kayser-Roth court did not articulate
a specific federal rule of decision.W7 Instead, the Kayser-Roth
court justified its decision to disregard the subsidiary as a corporate
entity as necessary to avoid thwarting congressional purposes.23
Specifically, the court noted that Congress intended that the federal
government be given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective
response to hazardous waste problems of national magnitude, and
that those responsible for the problems caused by the disposal of
hazardous waste bear the costs for remedying the harmful
Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. REoURCES &
ENV'T, No. 3, at 31 (1988). See also supra notes 168-191 and accompanying text (discussing the
Bunker Hill holdings).
234. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202.
235. See supra notes 204-212 and accompanying text (discussing the Kayser-Roth court's
adoption of an active participation standard to hold parent corporations directly liable as an operator).
236. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22-24 (D.R.I. 1989).
237. Id. at 23-24.
238. Id.
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conditions they created. 9 The court stated that CERCLA places
no special importance upon the corporate form.2 ° The court
apparently found Kayser-Roth's "overwhelming pervasive control"
over its subsidiary a sufficient basis, in the interests of public
convenience, fairness, and equity, to pierce the veil and hold the
parent liable.24 The court concluded that "any other result would
provide too much solace to deliberate polluters, who would use this
device as an escape.
' ' 2
Other courts have viewed CERCLA in a different light, failing
not only to find a basis under the statute to hold parent
corporations directly liable, but also unable to ascertain the intent
of Congress that generalized federal common law be supplanted by
a unique federal rule of decision on piercing the corporate veil in
order to further the purposes of CERCLA.243 In In re Acushnet
River and New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB
239. Id. So as not to frustrate these legislative purposes, the court held that "CERCLA must
be afforded a liberal construction." Id. (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) and New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d
Cir. 1985)).
240. Id. at 24. The court cited United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) in
support of this proposition. The Mottolo court, in holding an individual sole shareholder liable after
piercing the corporate veil, noted that the court looks closely "'at the purpose of the federal statute
to determine whether the statute places importance on the corporate form, an inquiry that usually
gives less respect to the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine." Mottolo,
695 F. Supp. at 624 (quoting Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986)). The Mottolo court
further observed that:
CERCLA's goal of ensuring that those responsible for problems caused by the
disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs of remedying the harmful
conditions they created would be frustrated if the mere act of incorporation
were allowed to impede the recovery of response costs, for a nonincorporated
violator could avoid liability simply by changing company structure.
Furthermore, the absence of explicit statutory language addressing the effect
of incorporation, the Act's strict liability scheme, and the broad and
encompassing categories of potentially responsible parties ineluctably lead the
Court to conclude that CERCLA places no importance on the corporate form.
Id.
241. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 24.
242. Id. The court chose to adopt a rule of decision based solely on the first prong of the
traditional piercing doctrine, apparently as a prophylactic device to prevent misuse of the corporate
form. Id.
243. See infra notes 247-252, 266-268 and accompanying text (discussing the Acushnet River
and Joslyn courts' adherence to traditional piercing doctrine).
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Pollution,2" the relevant issue before the court for the District of
Massachusetts was whether personal jurisdiction could be
established over RTE Corporation by piercing the veil of RTE's
subsidiary, Aerovox.245 The court agreed with the federal
government's argument that a uniform federal rule of decision
ought to govern the piercing inquiry.2" However, the court
rejected the government's proposed rule of decision calling for
piercing if the parent's contact with the subsidiary merely
"transcends a pure investment relationship."'247 The court noted
that the proposed rule was without support in policy or precedent,
and that little more than electing the subsidiary's board of directors
would be required to impose liability on a parent corporation.248
Refusing to "further some unspoken congressional intent," the
court found the government's proposed rule to be unauthorized by
CERCLA.249
The Acushnet River court did not dispute that the policies
embodied in a statute should affect the application of the piercing
test.25 The court did not, however, relax or dispense with the
traditional requirements of pervasive control of the subsidiary and
use of that control to effect a wrong, as have a number of
244. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
245. Id. at 30.
246. Id. at 31. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (explaining basis for the court's
choice of law decision).
247. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 32.
248. Id. (citing United States v. BUIss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 131-32 (E.D. Mo. 1985) and Wehner
v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27,28-30 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (both applying traditional veil
piercing principles in refusing to disregard the corporate form in CERCLA actions)). The Acushnet
River court also observed that it was difficult to see how the proposed rule would further the aims
the government contended demand such a strict standard, since
a corporation which wanted to reclaim and make productive a waste site could not do
so without risking all its corporate assets if it appeared to be more than passively
interested in the performance of its subsidiary. Patently, the sovereigns' rule would
discourage investors and reduce the number of solvent parties from which the sovereign
will be able to seek clean up costs and damages.
Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 357 (1944)).
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courts2 1 Instead, the court tailored its piercing inquiry by
focusing on RTE's involvement in the subsidiary's waste
management activities when the court assessed the degree of
"control," and on the existence of "wrongdoing. ' 252
In applying a focused piercing test, the court failed to find the
requisite "inordinate level of integration and control" to justify the
piercing remedy under CERCLA.253 The court found that RTE
respected the corporate separateness of Aerovox in significant
ways. 4 With a net worth of $17 million, Aerovox could not be
characterized as a "shell" corporation. z" The parent was not
siphoning funds from the subsidiary, since RTE had never paid
itself a dividend out of Aerovox's earnings. 256 Aerovox arranged
its own loans, developed its own budgets, and maintained its own
financial records and accounts.257 Cited as perhaps the most
251. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' modification of
traditional piercing standards to accommodate statutory objectives).
252. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33-34. The key factors which would weigh in favor of
piercing in Acushnet River, the court said, were "'suggestions of pervasive control by RTE over
Aerovox's hazardous waste disposal policies, or... an indication that RTE treats Aerovox as a mere
instrumentality with regard to the hazardous waste of RTE." Id.
253. Id. at 34. The court noted that a centralized cash management system such as the one
used by RTE was not the equivalent of intermingling funds, that quarterly and annual reports made
to RTE did not represent an untoward intrusion by the owner into the corporate enterprise, that
shareholder control of significant expenditures was not a disregard of corporate separateness, and that
identifying the subsidiary's products with the name of the parent was a frequently used marketing
strategy which did not imply a disrespect for separateness. Id. at 34-35. To the extent that Aerovox
was integrated into or controlled by RTE, the relationship did not appear to the court to be at a level
uncommon between parent and wholly owned subsidiary: "Although RTE no doubt influenced the
philosophy and management of Aerovox, this is true of all majority shareholders, and RTE has not
so extensively controlled Aerovox that Aerovox should be deemed its agent for purposes ofacquiring
personal jurisdiction." Id. at 35.
254. Id. at 34-35.
255. Id. at 35.
256. Id.
257. Id. The court rejected the government's argument that RTE must answer to Aerovox's
CERCLA liability because a primary purpose of RTE in forming a subsidiary to purchase the assets
of Aerovox Industries was to avoid liability for previous PCB contamination. Id. at 34. The court
found the argument:
... rather remarkable because it converts the very purpose for which the law
enables investors to incorporate into an impermissible evil .... Avoiding
liability through the corporate form, without more, is not a wrong that equity's
hand must right. In addition, there must be evidence of undercapitalization,
pervasive control, [or] fraud .... A rule such as the sovereigns propose here,
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important factor by the court in declining to pierce Aerovox's
corporate veil was the absence of any evidence suggesting that
RTE used Aerovox to shield RTE from CERCLA liability which
might otherwise arise out of the parent's operations."
In Joslyn Corporation v. T.L James & Co., 9 the plaintiff,
under an order to clean up the contaminated site of a wood treating
operation, sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold the parent of
the corporation whose assets the plaintiff had purchased liable as
a former owner or operator.2 In granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the trial court declined to follow the
Bunker Hill line of cases finding direct liability. 261 Additionally,
the court also found no triable issue of fact on the plaintiff's theory
that James & Company, the parent, should be derivatively liable for
its subsidiary's CERCLA liability.262 In the first appellate court
decision on parent corporation liability under CERCLA, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.6 3
In rejecting the theory that James Company could be liable
directly as a former owner or operator under CERCLA, the Court
of Appeals found no authority in CERCLA's text or legislative
history to impose individual liability on corporate officers or direct
liability on parent corporations.264 The court constrained its
analysis of the Act's liability provisions by common-law principles
which pierces the veil primarily because the investors went in with their eyes
open, would protect only those too ignorant to see the risk of a particular
enterprise. This Court cannot countenance a rule which punishes reasonable
investigation of the risks inherent in business opportunities.
Id.
258. Id. The court observed that "there is no evidence that Aerovox is making some component
vital to a RTE product line, the manufacture of which necessarily involves generating hazardous
substances .... RTE has done nothing to decrease Aerovox's ability to satisfy any judgment that
may enter in this action." id.
259. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 1I1
S. Ct. 957 (1991).
260. Id. at 223-224.
261. Id. at 226.
262. Id. at 232.
263. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80, 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1990) cert.
denied, III S. Ct. 957 (1991).
264. Id. at 82-83.
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of corporate law, citing the absence of congressional directive to
the contrary and refusing "to rewrite the language of the Act." 2"
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's adoption of the
Fifth Circuit's established general test for disregarding the
corporate form: The dominant corporation must have controlled the
subservient corporation and proximately caused the plaintiff harm
through misuse of this control.2" For purposes of piercing under
CERCLA, the court did not modify the degree of control necessary
for liability to attach under the general requirements of the first
prong of the traditional piercing doctrine.267 The court insisted
that the corporate entity would be disregarded only if James &
Company had exercised total domination of the subsidiary, Lincoln,
such that Lincoln had no separate corporate interests of its own and
functioned solely to achieve James' purposes, and if Lincoln was
used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud.268 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Lincoln was not a mere
265. Id. at 83. The court rejected the argument that congressional intent to hold those who
profited from hazardous waste sites responsible for the cost of cleanup and to cleanup contaminated
sites expeditiously provides the grounds to broadly construe CERCLA's liability provisions. Id. Cf.
supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding persuasive the argument that
congressional intent requires a liberal construction of liability under the Act). The Joslyn court
pointed to a similarly restrictive construction'of CERCLA's 'owner or operator" definition by the
Seventh Circuit in an action for contribution under CERCLA in which the latter court affirmed a
summary judgment for a defendant supplier of chemicals, holding it was not an operator. Joslyn, 893
F.2d at 83 (citing Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials, 861 F.2d 155, 157-58 (7th Cir.
1988)). The court stated that "[tio the point that courts could achieve 'more' of the legislative
objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes have not
only ends but limits." Id. The Joslyn court also specifically rejected the Northeastern Pharmaceutical
and Bunker Hill "control" test for liability under CERCLA's "owner or operator" language. Id. at
83. The court observed that "Congress is quite capable of creating statutes that hold shareholders or
controlling entities laible for the acts of valid corporations." Id. The court cited the difference
between the definition of "owner or operator" for facilities conveyed to state or local government
by bankruptcy, tax delinquency or abandonment, which explicitly adopts a control test, with the
definition of "owner or operator" for onshore or offshore facilities such as that at issue in Joslyn,
in which no control test appears. Id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1988) (no control test)
with § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988) (control test).
266. Id. at 83 (citing United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686,691 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986)).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 83-84 (citing Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 691).
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instrumentality of James.2" Finding the record sufficient to
support a conclusion that Lincoln operated independently of James,
the Court of Appeals pointed in particular to the subsidiary's
adherence to corporate formalities and the subsidiary's separate
daily operations."
C. Current State of the Law
Courts faced with the question of parent corporation liability
under CERCLA have disagreed both as to whether the statutory
language provides that a parent may be held directly liable for its
subsidiary's cleanup liability, and as to the standards to apply in
piercing a subsidiary's corporate veil. The Bunker Hill line of cases
stands for the proposition that a parent corporation that either
actively participates in the management of the operations of a
subsidiary, or perhaps even has merely the capacity to control such
operations, may be held directly liable under an expansive
269. Id. at 83. See also Joslyn Mfg Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222,227 (W.D. La.
1988). According to the trial court, factors to be considered in determining whether the necessary
degree of control has been exercised include whether (1) the parent and the subsidiary have common
stock ownership, common directors or officers, or common business departments; (2) the parent
finances the subsidiary; (3) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (4) the subsidiary
operates with grossly inadequate capital; (5) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the
subsidiary; (6) the subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent; (7) the parent
uses the subsidiary's property as its own; (8) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept
separate; and (9) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities. Id. Cf. supra notes
109-112 and accompanying text (discussing common law "laundry list" of factors indicating control
sufficient to justify piercing).
270. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83. Although Joslyn Co. pointed to six factors on the "laundry list"
which supported piercing, the trial court was not persuaded. The trial court dismissed each as
insignificant singly and when considered in totality, concluding that there was no triable issue of fact
on the matter of control. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 231 (W.D. La.
1988). For example, the court found the parent's 100% ownership of the subsidiary and the identity
of directors of the two corporations to be insufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Id. The fact that
James had made substantial loans to Lincoln, including the initial capitalization, was rebutted because
these loans were repaid. Id. Although the court found Joslyn's allegation that James hired and fired
Lincoln's executive officers to be *' minimally indicative of control," such conduct was merely an
incidental use of its power as controlling shareholder to elect officers and directors of the subsidiary.
Id. The court also dismissed as "only marginally relevant" the facts that three of Lincoln's officers
who were also officers of T.L. James & Company worked out of James Company's corporate offices
and that Lincoln neither had a lease nor paid rent, noting that "they had to work somewhere." Id.
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construction of CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator. ' 271
Other courts have declined to adopt such a broad interpretation of
"owner or operator," restricting their inquiry to whether the parent
corporation should be derivatively liable as a result of piercing the
subsidiary's corporate veil. 272 Some courts have held parent
corporations liable under both direct and derivative theories of
liability.2
7 3
The courts which have considered whether to pierce the
corporate veil have, without exception and apparently with little
difficulty, opted to exercise their authority to develop federal
common law to govern the piercing inquiry, instead of deferring to
state law.274 In so doing, they have generally concluded that
CERCLA is a federal program that must be uniform in character
throughout the nation,275 that application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal program,276 and that a
federal rule would not significantly disrupt commercial
271. See supra notes 168-224 and accompanying text (discussing Bunker Hill and its progeny).
272. See supra notes 243-270 and accompanying text (discussing the AcushnerRiver andJoslyn
courts' holdings).
273. See supra notes 225, 231-242 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet and Kayser-
Roth trial court holdings).
274. See supra notes 231,237-240,246 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet, Kayser-
Roth, and Acushnet River trial courts' holdings that federal law controlled).
275. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet and Acushnet River
courts' conclusions that formulation of a federal rule of decision was necessary). See also United
States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (finding that there were
'.compelling reasons for the development of a uniform federal common law in the area of hazardous
waste").
276. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet and Acushnet River
holdings). See also United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The
Chem-Dyne court stated that:
A liability standard which varies in the different forum states would undermine the
policies of the statute by encouraging illegal dumping in states with lax liability laws
T.... here is no good reason why the United States' right to reimbursement should be
subjected to the needless uncertainty and subsequent delay occasioned by diversified
local disposition when this matter is appropriate for uniform national treatment.
Id.
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relationships predicated on state law.277 However, in attempting
to fashion the content of a "uniform" federal rule of decision to
guide the courts in considering parent corporation liability under
CERCLA, the courts are in fact diametrically split. 7 8 Some
courts have tailored the traditional piercing doctrine to reflect and
accommodate the purposes of CERCLA by reducing the degree of
control necessary to satisfy the first prong, and by dispensing with
the second and third prongs' requirement that the parent use its
control of the subsidiary for an improper purpose. 9 These courts
also ruled that parents could be directly liable under CERCLA, and
the key factors supporting this alternative basis of liability were
generally the same under both theories: Active participation in the
management of the subsidiary or capacity to control those
operations, particularly the waste disposal activities.28  In
contrast, other courts have applied strict formulations of the
traditional piercing rules, apparently finding no basis in CERCLA
or the Act's legislative history indicating congressional intent to
accord less deference to the fundamental principle of limited
liability of the corporate entity. 281
277. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675
F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987). The Acushnet River court stated that the "Court need not worry
that a uniform federal rule would frustrate commercial relationships properly predicated on state law.
The issue here involves the rights of third parties external to the corporation. Shareholders generally
are entitled to rely on the law of the incorporating state solely with regards [sic] to the internal affairs
of the corporation." Id. Accord, United States v. Nicolet, Inc. 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
278. See supra notes 232-242, 247-252, 266-268 and accompanying text (discussing the
piercing tests used by the trial courts in Nicolet, Kayser-Roth, Acushnet River and by the trial and
appellate courts in Joslyn).
279. See supra notes 232-234, 238-242 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet and
Kayser-Roth trial courts' formulation of piercing standards).
280. See supra notes 198-202,204-212,232-235,237-242 and accompanying text (discussing
the alternative theories of liability of the courts in Nicole: and Kayser-Roth).
281. See supra notes 247-258,266-270 and accompanying text (discussing the Acushnet River
and Joslyn courts' application of traditional piercing standards).
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V. TOWARD A UNIFORM FEDERAL RULE OF DECISION
GOVERNING PARENT CORPORATION LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA
The split among the federal courts as to the legal standards
applicable to piercing the corporate veil in CERCLA cases
promotes inconsistent and inequitable enforcement of CERCLA's
liability scheme, increases the uncertainty faced by companies
assessing their potential liabilities under the Act, and impedes
expeditious cleanup of Superfund sites by deterring settlement and
encouraging litigation. Part V of this Comment underscores the
need for a truly uniform federal rule of decision to apply in
piercing inquiries, briefly reviews the primary purposes of
CERCLA and related factors which should be reflected in a
uniform rule, evaluates the various formulations developed by the
courts in terms of the extent to which they further the statutory
objectives, and finally suggests a preferred approach.
A. The Need For a Uniform Federal Rule: Encouraging
Settlement Agreements
In addition to the fundamental jurisprudential reasons cited by
the courts in opting to exercise their power to fashion federal
common law under CERCLA,282 resolution of conflicting rules
of decision governing parent corporation liability would encourage
settlement agreements among potentially responsible parties and the
EPA. Given the huge backlog of sites on the National Priority
Lis2 83 as well as the substantial transaction costs entailed in
CERCLA litigation, 28 Congress and the EPA have endeavored
282. See supra notes 274-277 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' reasoning in
deciding to exercise their power to formulate federal common law under CERCLA).
283. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting the number of sites currently on the
NPL as well as potential NFL sites).
284. During congressional hearings on the administration's proposals for reauthorization of
CERCLA, members of Congress and others expressed concern about the considerable legal and
administrative expenses involved in the Superfund program. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 54 (1985). Public and private sector transaction costs are estimated to be substantial. EPA projected
that enforcement costs will account for 12% of all Superfund expenditures during the period from
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to fimd ways to encourage more voluntary cleanups.285 The
objectives of CERCLA are achieved more effectively and
efficiently if site cleanup agreements can be executed among the
EPA and responsible parties.286 If responsible parties undertake
the cleanup, Superfund monies are preserved for other sites for
which solvent responsible parties cannot be found. Also, because
of federal contracting requirements and other factors, experience
suggests that if EPA performs the cleanup, the cleanup will not
only be more costly but will take considerably longer than if
responsible parties perform the work.28 7 While negotiations can
be very resource-consuming for EPA, resolution of a case through
1985 to 1995. Insurance Issues and Superfind: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1985). An insurance industry-
commissioned study estimated, based on EPA's projected cost of $14.6 billion to clean up 1800 NPL
sites, that total legal and other transaction costs of efforts to have potentially responsible parties pay
for the cleanup could exceed $8 billion, of which $6.4 billion would be borne by the private sector.
Id. at 118. See id. at 115-37 (summarizing the American Insurance Association-commissioned study).
235. CERCLA as enacted in 1980 contained virtually no language to guide or encourage
voluntary settlement of EPA claims against potentially responsible parties for cleanup costs.
Nonetheless, the court in one leading case on the standard of liability under CERCLA found
congressional intent to "induce voluntary responses" to clean up contaminated sites. United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983). On December 5, 1984 EPA issued
an Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy. 50 Fed. Reg. 5034 (1985). The SARA Amendments to
CERCLA basically affirmed the EPA policy and authorized a number of aids to settlement. See 42
U.S.C. § 9622 (1988) (SARA amendment). See also COMING CLEA, supra note 26, at 6 (responsible
parties are paying for over 50% of site studies and cleanups through voluntary settlements, and EPA
wants to increase this contribution). See generally Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod & Connors, supra note
37, at 10335-36, 10373-74.
286. Rikleen, Negotiating SuperfundSettementAgreements, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 697,
704-05 (1982-83). Potentially responsible parties also reap advantages from settling rather than
litigating Superfund cases. Id. For example, settling avoids the potential application of a strict, joint
and several liability standard in actual litigation and provides the benefit of participating in the
decisions specifying the scope of its involvement in the site cleanup. Id. In addition, responsible
parties will probably reduce their transaction costs by settling rather than incurring costs of preparing
for Superfund cases which can take months. Id. Finally, a responsible party may reap public relations
advantages by settling since the company can portray itself as the good corporate citizen that
volunteered to solve an environmental problem. Id. But cf. COMING CL.AN, supra note 26, at 161-64
(suggesting that cleanup standards are compromised and less expensive technology is selected in
cleanup settlement negotiations, resulting in considerable dollar savings for responsible parties but
raising questions as to whether major follow-up cleanups will be necessary if the remedies selected
prove ineffective).
287. Rikleen, supra note 286, at 704; Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod & Connors, supra note 37,
at 10365.
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settlement will invariably consume less time and money than if the
case were actually litigated. 88
However, conflict among the courts as to the construction of
"owner or operator" and as to the content of a uniform federal
piercing rule under CERCLA creates uncertainty as to the liability
of the parent of an insolvent or dissolved potentially responsible
party. This uncertainty is not conducive to consummating
settlement agreements. Where a potentially responsible party
believes it possesses a viable defense, the prospect of incurring
liability for enormous site response costsF' 9 provides the party
with a strong incentive to engage in time consuming and expensive
litigation. When one or more parties choose to litigate, settlement
becomes more difficult as other admittedly liable parties balk for
fear of contributing more than their equitable share.2" As a
consequence, resources may be devoted to litigation instead of
cleanup, and delay in cleanup extends the potential for
environmental damages from toxic releases.
B. Federal Policies Advanced by CERCLA: Criteria for
Evaluating Alternative Rules of Decision
Courts and commentators have promoted fashioning federal
rules of decision in veil-piercing inquiries in light of the policies
underlying a particular federal statute, rather than relying on a
generalized federal veil-piercing doctrine.291 Accordingly, this
section reviews CERCLA's principal policy objectives and other
288. Rikleen, supra note 286, at 704. But see Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 315
(large transaction costs are likely to be incurred regardless of whether the case is litigated or settled).
289. During the SARA hearings, EPA reported that the average site cleanup costs were $8.3
million. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985). Under SARA's more stringent cleanup
standards, EPA estimated that average site response costs would increase to between $30 and $50
million. High Cost of Permanent Superfund Cleanups to Result in Interim Actions, Porter Says, 17
Eavt Rep. 778, 779 (BNA) (Sept. 26, 1986).
290. Comment, Successor Liability, supra note 49, at 234.
291. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution,
675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987) ("it is... clear that the policies embodied in a statute should
direct the veil piercing inquiry"); Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 865 n.82 (citing cases). See
also supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text (discussing how courts modify the traditional
piercing tests to accommodate federal statutory objectives).
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factors relevant to an assessment of which piercing rules, and
which construction of "owner or operator" articulated by the
courts, most closely promote these statutory aims.
1. Rapid Cleanup of Contaminated Sites
The principal objective behind enactment of CERCLA was to
expedite response to the nationwide threats posed by thousands of
improperly managed hazardous waste sites that substantially
endanger public health and the environment. 211 Many courts
adopting expansive constructions of the Act's liability provisions
have justified their rulings on the basis of congressional intent that
as many toxic waste sites as possible be cleaned up as quickly as
possible.293
2. Notions of Corrective Justice: Let the Polluter, or Someone
Somehow Connected with the Polluter, Pay
The second objective of CERCLA is to place the primary
burden for cleaning up, or financing site response actions, on the
parties that acted to create the hazards. 294 This "make the
292. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio) (citing 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 6119-20).
293. See, e.g., id. at 805, 808, 810 (joint and several liability); Ohio ex rel Brown v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1313-14 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (in holding transporters retroactively liable,
the court observed that "the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to clean up
as many dumps as possible with Superfund"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982) (justifying absolute liability subject only to limited statutory
defenses by citing congressional intent "that the federal government be immediately given the tools
necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of national magnitude resulting from
hazardous waste disposal").
294. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112, (D. Minn.
1982) (finding that "Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal
of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they
created"); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that "the Act
is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste dump sites and when possible to
place the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the danger created by such sites");
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (finding that CERCLA "was designed to insure, so far as possible, that the parties responsible
for the creation of hazardous waste sites be liable for the response costs in cleaning them up."); Ohio
ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (finding "little doubt that
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polluter pay" approach is based on the principle of corrective
justice, which is grounded in the idea that those who cause harm
should pay for the harm.295 Features of CERCLA's liability
system, both as designed and as expansively interpreted by the
courts, have, however, attenuated the link between liability under
CERCLA and notions of fairness based on corrective justice.
Liability under CERCLA does not depend on a finding that a
defendant's act caused or contributed to the actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a waste site.29 CERCLA's
weak causation requirements, combined with its permitted
imposition of joint and several liability on a broad range of
parties,297 can expose parties having only a tangential relation to
acts which caused harm to the full financial burden of site response
costs totalling millions of dollars.2 98
Congress intended for those individuals who were responsible for creating the hazards from these
wastes to bear the cost of the clean up").
295. Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 306; Developments in the Law, supra note 3,
at 1477; Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example
of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L REv. 575, 593 (1983) [hereinafter Tort
Analysis and Toxic Waste Victim Compensation].
296. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Act's weak causation
requirements).
297. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' construction of the
Act to permit joint and several liability).
298. See supra notes 44,289 and accompanying text (discussing response cost components and
average site cleanup costs). See also Klotz & Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal and State
Environmental Law: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 COM. LU. 275,275-76 (1987)
(setting forth five situations of extensive liability). Representative Stockman, an opponent of
CERCLA's expansive liability standard, stated in a House debate:
I would like to suggest to the Members of this House that some day down the
road about a year from now they are going to receive a letter from a company
in their district that has just received a $5 or $10 million liability suit from
EPA that was triggered by nothing more than a decision of a GS-14 that some
landfill, some disposal site somewhere, needed to be cleaned up and, as a
result of an investigation that his office did, he found out that that company
in your district contributed a few hundred pounds of waste to that site 30 years
ago ....
[And once EPA has] found that deep pocket, they will immediately go
to court and sue that deep pocket ....
126 CONo. REC. 26,786 (1980).
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3. Restitution: Preventing Unjust Enrichment
Related to corrective justice is restitution, or preventing the
unjust enrichment of those who have benefited from inadequate
disposal of toxic waste. The Senate Report on the original
CERCLA bill evidenced the intent that contributions from firms
which had been "generically" associated with toxic waste in the
past should be the primary source of funds for cleanup, since these
firms profited from producing and using such substances.'"
Courts have been responsive to the restitution argument in
interpreting liability under CERCLA. For example, the
Northeastern Pharmaceutical court observed that "Congress has
determined that the persons who bore the fruits of hazardous waste
disposal also bear the costs of cleaning it up. '9 300
However, the restitution argument is weakened by the fact that
parties currently paying for cleanup actually may have received
little or no benefit from disposal practices which took place years
ago. Such benefits may have gone to former employees in the form
of higher wages, to former shareholders as dividends, or to former
consumers in the form of lower prices.3"' But there is probably
some continuity between past and present beneficiaries because if
the company's past profits enabled it to prosper, the current
owners, employees and business affiliates are likely better off as a
result. 3 2 The Third Circuit in Smith Land & Improvement Corp.
v. Celotex Corp.0 3 relied on such continuity in holding that a
299. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in SEN. COMM. ON
ENVIRONMENT & PuB. WoRKs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, A LISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REsPONSF, COMPENSATION AND LIABLITY ACT OF 1980, at 320
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
300. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848
(W.D. Mo. 1984). See Ohio er rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
The Georgeoff court cited EPA's argument that "society should not bear the cost of protecting the
public from hazards produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dump site owner-
operator who has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving these substances and now
wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibility for the present hazards to society that have
been created .... [R]elieving industry of responsibility establishes a precedent seriously adverse to
the public interest .... .- Id. (citing SEN. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 98 (1980)).
301. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1542.
302. Id.
303. 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988).
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successor corporation may be liable for asbestos waste cleanup
costs.3 4 The court found that benefits from the use of hazardous
materials accrued to the original corporation as well as the original
corporation's successors and their shareholders and inured only
indirectly, if at all, to the general public. °
4. Deterrence of Future Releases of Toxic Waste and Efficient
Allocation of Resources Through Forced Internalization of
Costs of Hazardous Waste Management
CERCLA's legislative history, along with commentary, suggest
that the Act's broad liability scheme was intended, and in fact
operates, to create incentives for safer disposal of toxic waste and
to promote efficient allocation of economic resources through
forced internalization of waste management costs. 306  Strict
304. Id. at 92.
305. Id. This court, along with some commentators, seems unmindful of the fact that the bulk
of Superfund revenues is derived not from taxpayers generally, but from industry. See Note,
Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1542. Under CERCLA as originally enacted, 87.5% of
the $1.6 billion fund was to be raised by a tax on crude oil, imported petroleum products and basic
chemicals, with the remaining 12.5% contributed from general revenues. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982).
Pursuant to the SARA amendments which increased the fund to $8.5 billion over five years, the
funding base has been broadened considerably, although general revenues actually contribute
proportionately somewhat more (14.7%) than under the original funding scheme. 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A,
4611-12, 4661-62, 4671-72, 9507 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 11(p) (1988). See supra note 29 (sources
of tax revenues funding the Superfund). In approving a predecessor of the environmental tax
ultimately enacted, the Senate Finance Committee stated that the Committee was "of the view that
the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites is a broad societal problem extending beyond the
chemical and petroleum industries. Thus, the committee recommended a new excise tax on all
manufacturing sectors of the economy." SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE, SUPERFUND REVENUE AcT OF
1985, S. REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985).
306. See S. REP. No. 848,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980), reprinted in LEGIsLATIVE HtsTORY,
supra note 299, at 341. The report on Senate Bill 1480, the Senate version of CERCLA, stated:
In some of these cases the choice is not between an innocent victim and
a careless defendant, but between two blameless parties. In such cases the costs
should be borne by the one of the two innocent parties whose acts instigated
or made the harm possible.
The advantage of this approach is not only that it is fair, but that it will
cause the economy to operate better. Strict liability is, in effect, a method of
allocating resources through choice in the market place.
The most desirable system of loss distribution is one in which the prices
of goods accurately reflect their full costs to society. This therefore requires,
uast, that the cost of injuries be borne by the activities which caused them,
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liability, it is argued, is an efficient means of encouraging the
development of safer waste management practices. 7 Companies,
aware that they will be liable for cleanup costs for any release with
which they are associated, will invest in safer waste disposal
methods."° Associated costs will be reflected in the prices of
products creating toxic waste, causing consumers to reduce their
purchase of such products, which in turn makes it "more likely
that the market will attain an efficient balance between chemical
consumption and safe disposal." 3"
As appealing as this justification for CERCLA's strict liability
may be in theory, the operative effect of the cost internalization
rationale is reduced by several factors. First, the primary deterrent
for inadequate toxic waste handling and disposal is provided by the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976. 10
RCRA instituted a comprehensive, closed "cradle to grave" system
for tracking hazardous waste, requiring the formal identification of
waste as hazardous, the development of manifests to leave a paper
trail tracking all shipments, and certification through a permit
system that ensures that performance standards for safe treatment,
storage and disposal are being met. 311 RCRA provides the
whether or not fault is involved, because, either way, the injury is a real cost
of these activities. Second, it requires that among the several parties engaged
in an enterprise the loss be placed on the party which is most likely to cause
the burden to be reflected in the price of whatever the enterprise sells ....
[Siocial and economic resources are more efficiently allocated when the actual
costs of goods and services (including the losses they entail) are reflected in
their prices to the consumer.
Id.
307. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1519-20.
308. Id.
309. Id. See White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes,
25 Hous. L REV. 899, 915-18 (1988) (explaining the economies of internalization and causation-
based liability).
310. Pub. L No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991i (1988)).
311. See generally, F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLoCK, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND PoLicY 12 (1984); J. QUARLES, FEDERAL REOULATION OF HAzARDoUs
WASTES-A GUIDE To RCRA (1982); R. FORTUNA & D. LENNEr, HAZARDOUS WASTE
REoULATION-THE NEw ERA: AN ANALYSIS AND GUIDE TO RCRA AND THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
(1987) (discussing RCRA).
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government with significant enforcement powers subjecting
generators, transporters, and site owners or operators who do not
comply with the extensive regulations to injunctions, fines, and
criminal penalties."' Although CERCLA applies to both active
and inactive sites, CERCLA probably provides only an additional
increment of deterrence to those who already are subject to RCRA
enforcement actions.313
Secondly, CERCLA's deterrent effect is reduced by the
possibility that corporate managers may not adequately incorporate
future risks into their current decisionmaking processes.314
Because managers may discount the possibility that the corporation
may be held liable in the future or may find it difficult to establish
the present value of future costs which might result from an
adverse court decision, the threat of future CERCLA liability may
not have any deterrent effect in practice.315
5. Cost-spreading
Legislative history indicates that CERCLA's broad liability
scheme was intended to spread cleanup costs among as many
parties as possible.316 Yet, in practice, because the EPA can rely
312. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988) (authorizing the EPA, for violations of the statute or any
implementing regulations, to issue compliance orders or to bring a civil action to force compliance);
id. § 6928(d-e) (establishing criminal penalties for certain acts involving the transportation, storage,
disposal or export of hazardous waste); id. § 6928(h) (giving EPA the power to order that corrective
action be taken at any interim status facility form where there is or has been a release of hazardous
waste); id. § 6973(a) (where hazardous waste presents an imminent and substantial threat to human
health or the environment, the EPA has the authority to compel abatement of the hazard).
313. Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 302.
314. Id. at 303. See Note, TortAnalysis and Toxic Waste Victim Compensation, supra note 295,
at 600-04 (identifying several factors that defeat accurate cost-estimation and cost-internalization, and
that in turn impede the consequent deterrent effect of liability for damage caused by toxic waste);
Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Klevorick, 14 J. LEGAL
STUm. 633, 639-40 (1985) (noting that corporate managers are subject to a wide variety of
psychological and economic pitfalls in translating long-term risk projections into current management
decisions, including tendencies to ignore the problems facing the next generation of corporate
officers).
315. Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 303.
316. See supra note 48 (citing legislative history indicating intent to spread costs). See also
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.NJ. 1983) (noting cost-spreading as one of
CERCLA's legislative aims and citing legislative history).
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on joint and several liability and because multi-party litigation is
expensive and complex, the government has little incentive to sue
all potentially responsible parties at a site and hence focuses its
resources on a few wealthy or highly visible defendants. 3 7 This
incomplete enforcement by the EPA results in a liability "lottery"
which forces the holder of the "winning" ticket to incur
substantial costs to locate and implead other solvent responsible
paties.31 EPA's enforcement is also antithetical to other stated
objectives of CERCLA's liability system, namely corrective justice,
since parties bear the cleanup cost burdens for which they are not
responsible, 319 and deterrence, because incomplete enforcement
tends to insulate small companies from liability and force "deep
pockets" to overinternalize the costs of waste disposal.320
317. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1529. The government does not always
sue all responsible parties. See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1260-61 (S.D. 111. 1984) (alleged waste generator not entitled to dismissal on ground government was
aware of numerous parties who disposed of hazardous waste at a site but who were not joined as
defendants); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985) (defendants noted that
EPA had failed to join some 200 to 500 persons with ownership interests in the land on which the
release had occurred).
318. White, supra note 309, at 913; Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1530.
Obstacles to effective contribution by all responsible parties include the following: many of the
smaller responsible parties may have become judgment-proof; impleaded parties are liable only for
their apportioned share of the damages and hence liability for shares of absent parties, as well as for
the transaction costs of impleading other responsible parties, which can run into the millions of
dollars, must be borne by the original defendants. Id. at 1531-32.
319. White, supra note 309, at 913. "'The methodology for allocating these [cleanup] costs is
such that any firm who has been connected with any amount of disposal of hazardous wastes is, in
effect, holding a lottery ticket that potentially represents millions of dollars of liabilities to the firm
for the cleanup of wastes unrelated to its own activities." Id. See also Note, Developments in the
Law, supra note 3, at 1530 (observing that "'[joint and several liability may prove unfair when it
forces certain parties to pay for cleaning up releases to which they did not contribute and from which
they derived no past financial benefit"). "Mhe driving force behind CERCLA cleanup actions is
the government's power to threaten an individual defendant with overwhelming liability for what
other waste disposers have done." Id. at 1513.
320. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1530-31. The authors of the Note argue
that joint and several liability leads to both overdeterrence and underdeterrence of unsafe waste
disposal rather than to a uniform incentive for safe behavior, because the incomplete enforcement
mechanism largely shields small companies from liability and forces wealthy companies to
overinternalize the costs of waste disposal. Id. Companies that escape liability do not bear the costs
of their unsafe waste disposal and their products are underpriced and overproduced. Id. Conversely,
companies held jointly and severally liable pay more than their share of cleanup costs and their
products are overpriced and underproduced. Id. "The result is to shift production away from the only
producers that might alter their behavior in response to the threat of CERCLA liability." Id. at 1531.
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6. Revenue Raising to Finance Site Cleanup
Although not a stated or explicitly intended statutory objective
of CERCLA, in practice the various components of the Act's
expansive liability provisions function less to serve the objectives
of corrective justice, restitution, deterrence, or cost-spreading than
to function as a financing mechanism.32 This mechanism shifts
the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites to parties with some
connection, however remote, to those sites.2 The Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, during
the Superfund reauthorization hearings, expressed this view in
observing that "[t]he theory underlying Superfund's liability
scheme was, and is, that government should obtain the full costs of
cleanup from those it targets for enforcement ... 3
Courts, in liberally interpreting CERCLA's liability provisions,
have responded to statements in the legislative history indicating
Congress' awareness that the $1.6 billion Superfund would not
provide sufficient funds to clean up all existing dump sites posing
public health and environmental risks. 24 Courts have consistently
rejected constitutional arguments against CERCLA's broad
imposition of liability, reasoning that the need to control the
hazardous waste problem justifies an essentially ad hoc imposition
321. See Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 311 (arguing CERCLA liability is more
like a revenue collection measure than a common law liability system and that its major function is
to compensate the government).
322. Id.
323. 132 CoNe. REc. S14903 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (remarks of Senator Stafford).
324. See, e.g., Ohio ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(citing Congress' awareness that the costs of the cleanup it envisioned would greatly exceed the
amount of the Superfund and its intent to clean up as many dumps as possible with the Superfund
in selecting a construction of the statute that will most fully implement the Congressional intent);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that -[t]he [$]1.6 billion
Superfund has been repeatedly acknowledged as an inadequate response to the immense cost of
cleaning up existing hazardous waste sites"). But see Moskowitz & Hoyt, Enforcement of CERCLA
Against Innocent Owners of Property, 19 LOY. LA.L REV. 1171, 1174 (1986) (arguing that the
courts, -[m]otivated by a desire to provide a broad financial base for cleaning up inactive waste sites,
... have extended liability beyond that envisioned by Congress").
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of liability on solvent parties with some connection to disposal
sites.32
5
Z Importance Given By CERCLA to the Corporate Form
Another consideration given by federal courts in fashioning
rules of decision to guide veil-piercing inquiries in federal question
cases is the extent to which a statute places importance on the
corporate form.326 Although neither CERCLA nor its legislative
history expressly addresses this point, the Act defines those parties
who may be liable in such a way as to indicate that Congress
intended not to accord the corporate entity as much protection as
under traditional state corporate law doctrine. Specifically,
CERCLA defines "owner or operator" in part as "any person
owning or operating" a facility, 327  and "person" in all-
encompassing terms.328 Indeed, courts have held managing
shareholders and parent corporations liable based on their reading
of the plain meaning of these definitions.329 Moreover, at least
one court has concluded, in holding a site owner and operator
personally liable notwithstanding the individual's incorporation to
escape potential personal liability, that CERCLA's silence
regarding the effect of incorporation, the Act's strict liability
standard, and the broad categories of potentially responsible parties
"ineluctably lead the Court to the conclusion that CERCLA places
no importance on the corporate form. ' 33' This conclusion was
325. Comment, Successor Liability, supra note 49, at 229 n.l I (citing United States v. Seymour
Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-42 (S.D. Ind. 1982) and United States v. Price, 557 F.
Supp. 1103 (D.NJ. 1983)).
326. See, e.g., Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that when
federal courts look at the purpose of a federal statute to determine whether the statute places
importance on the corporate form, the inquiry "usually gives less respect to the corporate form than
does the strict common law alter ego doctrine").
327. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1988).
328. See supra note 53 (definition of "person").
329. See supra notes 174-224, and infra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing cases
holding parent corporations and individual shareholders liable as owners or operators).
330. United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615,624 (D.N.H. 1988). The court concluded that
"'the expressed beneficial legislative goals underlying CERCLA, the derogation of those goals which
would result were the Court to place significance on [defendant's] incorporation, and the identity of
ownership and modality of operation between the old and the new business entities provide ample
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reiterated without elaboration by the trial court in United States v.
Kayser Roth Corp. in holding a parent corporation liable.33
8 Other Principles of Statutory Interpretation Relevant to
Formulation of a Uniform Federal Rule of Decision
In addition to the specific objectives furthered by CERCLA,
three general principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to
the formulation of a uniform federal rule of decision to guide
questions of parent corporation liability under CERCLA. The first
calls for a consistent, harmonious interpretation of the various
provisions of a statute, since a statute is passed as a whole and not
in sections, and is derived from a general purpose and intent.332
The second relevant general principle is that statutes enacted for
the protection of public health are to be given an extremely liberal
construction to maximize the accomplishment of their
objectives.333 The third applicable general rule of statutory
basis for the Court to hold as a matter of law that the difference in legal entities may be here
disregarded insofar as CERCLA § 107 liability is concerned." Id.
331. 724 F. Supp. 15, 24 (D.R.. 1989). This statement was made in connection with the court's
holding Kayser-Roth liable as an owner under a piercing the corporate veil theory. This basis for
liability was not reviewed by the First Circuit, which affirmed the trial court's alternative basis for
holding Kayser-Roth liable directly as an operator. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
24,25-28 (1st Cir. 1990). See also supra notes 203-212, 236-242 and accompanying text (discussing
Kayser-Roth).
332. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON, § 46.05, at 90 (4th ed.
1984).
333. 3 id. § 71.02, at 517. Protection of public health was a foremost objective of CERCLA.
See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) (report on one of the three bills which
culminated in CERCLA's adoption included an extensive statement of the problems of hazardous
waste sites, including contamination of surface water and groundwater and consequent damage to
public water supplies, the imposition of threats to public health resulting from such contamination).
In adopting SARA, Congress increased CERCLA's emphasis on protecting public health by adding
a broad directive to give primary attention to those releases which the President believes may present
a public health threat. Pub. L No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§9604(a)(1) (1988). See 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 332, § 60.01, at 55 (a liberal construction "is
ordinarily one which makes the statutory rule or principle apply to more things or in more situations
than would be the case under a strict construction").
919
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22
construction is that remedial statutes are liberally construed to
advance the remedy.3"
These principles, taken together, have found their application
in the courts' virtually consistent liberal and expansive
interpretations of the liability provisions of CERCLA. The use of
these principles is exemplified by the court's finding in United
States v. Reilly Tar and Chemical Corp.35 that, to achieve
congressional objectives of a prompt response to hazardous waste
disposal problems and of placing the cleanup cost burden on those
responsible, CERCLA "should not be narrowly interpreted.., to
limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the
limits expressly provided. ' 3
6
C. Evaluation of Alternative Rules of Decision
The case law has generated three basic approaches to
determine the circumstances under which parent corporations will
be found liable as owners or operators under CERCLA. These may
be categorized as: (1) Capacity to control the activities of the
subsidiary, which in its broadest sense amounts to strict liability for
parent corporations; (2) the generalized federal common law
piercing test; and (3) substantial ownership interest and exercise of
control of (or active participation in) the operations of the
subsidiary. This section reviews each alternative approach and
concludes that the last-mentioned formulation is the most consistent
334. 3 SuTHERLAND, supra note 332, §60.01, at 55. This principle was applied by the Third
Circuit in Smith Land in holding a successor corporation liable under CERCLA section 107(a)(l),
title 42 United States Code section 9607(a)(1): "The Act views response liability as a remedial, rather
than a punitive, measure whose primary aim is to correct the hazardous condition." Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir. 1988). See, e.g., United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (goal of CERCLA is "overwhelmingly
remedial"), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 752 (1991); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Fanns Dairy,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (as CERCLA is a remedial statute, the court is "obligated
to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes").
335. 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
336. Id. at 1112. See also Fket Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 ("ambiguous statutory terms should
be construed to favor liability"); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
1985) ("[w]e will not interpret section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's
goal, in the absence of a specific congressional intent otherwise").
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with the objectives advanced by CERCLA's liability scheme, as
interpreted by the courts.
0
1. Capacity to Control the Subsidiary: Strict Liability of
Parent Corporations
The Bunker Hill court, in its test for determining parent
corporation liability as an owner or operator under CERCLA for
cleanup costs associated with the insolvent subsidiary's operations,
suggested that mere capacity to control the hazardous waste
disposal activities of its subsidiary is sufficient to establish
liability.337 Interpreted broadly, this test would amount to a rule
of strict liability for parent corporations. Several commentators
have also recommended categorical liability for parent corporations
as the preferred federal rule of decision under CERCLA.338 While
such an approach would furnish the certainty of a bright-line rule
and would advance a few of the objectives of CERCLA's liability
system, this standard falls short when considered against the full
range of the aims of the statute's liability scheme.
Bunker Hill held that a parent corporation will be liable if the
parent had: (1) The capacity to discover a release; (2) the power to
control the subsidiary's release; and (3) the capacity to prevent and
abate the damage.339 Since Corporation A, as the controlling
shareholder of Corporation B, inherently has the power to dictate
the management and operations of Corporation B, broadly
construed the Bunker Hill test is simply a rule of strict liability.
Although the Bunker Hill court relied on specific findings to show
that Gulf in fact exercised control of Bunker Hill's finances and
that Gulf reaped considerable financial benefit from Bunker Hill's
operations,' the test adopted, if applied literally, imposes strict
liability. It should be noted, however, that the court apparently did
337. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
338. See, e.g., Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 HARv. L. REv. 986, 998, 1002-03 (1986); Comment, Refining the Scope, supra note
64, at 52-60.
339. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672.
340. Id.
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not intend to frame such a sweeping rule. The court cautioned that
"in adopting the above test, care must be taken so that 'normal'
activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not
automatically warrant finding the parent an owner or
operator."' 1 Despite this caveat, at least two courts have read
the Bunker Hill test literally and refused to adopt the test."42
Commentators have cited economic analysis to both justify and
criticize a rule of strict liability of parent corporations. Such a
standard, it is argued, would internalize the risks of setting up
subsidiary corporations to perform hazardous waste disposal
activities, reduce the exposure of involuntary creditors to the risk
of releases of hazardous waste, and reduce enforcement costs. 343
Other commentators argue that the social loss from reducing
investment in certain types of projects as a consequence of
seriously modifying limited liability might far exceed the gains
from reduction in the "moral hazard" of limited liability--that is,
the incentive created by limited liability to transfer the cost of risky
activities to creditors.'
Of the three alternatives, strict liability of parent corporations
would maximize the revenue raising objective of CERCLA's
liability system since strict liability would assure the availability of
deep pockets to fund cleanups at sites operated by insolvent
341. Id.
342. See United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del. 1989); Rockwell
International Corp. v. IU International Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. III. 1988). The New
Castle County court stated that "mere ability to exercise control as a result of the financial
relationship of the parties is insufficient for liability to attach" and that "the entity (or person sought
to be strapped with liability] must actually exercise control." New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. at
866 (quoting Rockwell, 702 F. Supp. at 1390). See also supra notes 213-221 and accompanying text
(discussing the Rockwell decision). But cf. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557
(1 th Cir. 1990) (holding that a secured creditor may be liable on the basis of its participation "in
the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes"), cert. denied, 1I1 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
343. See Note, supra note 338, at 988-98. It is argued inter alia that the investment rationale
does not support allowing limited liability for parent corporations because corporations are not risk-
averse in their investment strategies, that allowing limited liability for parent corporations has the
effect of subsidizing inefficient investment in hazardous waste disposal activities, and that parent
corporations make good risk-bearers. Id.
344. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 134, at 104. The authors also argue that categorical
liability for parent corporations would give unaffiliated firms a competitive advantage, which in turn
would not benefit victims of torts because larger firms are apt to carry more insurance. Id. at I 11.
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responsible parties, thereby preventing depletion of Superfund and
providing for rapid cleanup of more contaminated sites. Yet, as
even its advocates concede, the strict liability alternative would do
so only by imposing liability arbitrarily. 5 Such a consequence
would be antithetical to the objectives of corrective justice and
restitution, since parties who neither were responsible nor
benefitted from hazardous waste disposal would be made
liable.46 Similarly, strict liability of parent corporations would
exacerbate the present tendency of the federal government to target
enforcement efforts on large, high-visibility deep pockets, to the
detriment of CERCLA's cost-spreading aim.
Finally, although several courts have held that CERCLA places
little importance on the corporate form, 7 it is doubtful whether
even those courts would find grounds in the 'Act's text or
legislative history to support the complete abrogation of so
fundamental a tenet of American law as limited liability for
corporate shareholders. Numerous courts have interpreted the
definition of "owner or operator" '348  as requiring active
participation by a shareholder for liability to attach under section
107 of CERCLA.349 Hence, the alternative of strict liability for
parent corporations is unlikely to be accommodated harmoniously
and consistently within CERCLA's existing liability
framework,35 and the widespread adoption by the federal courts
345. Comment, Refining the Scope, supra note 64, at 55.
346. See id. at 55, n.72.
347. See supra notes 330-331 and accompanying text (discussing the Mottolo and Kayser-Roth
trial courts' findings).
348. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (defimition of owner or operator).
349. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del. 1989);
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. I1. 1988); United States v.
Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Pa. September 4, 1985). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-
(2) (1988) (CERCLA section 107(a)(1)-(2) liability of current and former owners or operators).
350. See supra note 342 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal of two courts to adopt
a strict liability standard) and infra note 351 and accompanying text (discussing other courts" refusal
to read into CERCLA any congressional intent to disregard the corporate form).
923
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
of a strict liability standard for parent corporations of responsible
parties is improbable absent a statutory amendment.
351
2. The Generalized Federal Common Law Piercing Test
In Acushnet River and Joslyn, the courts declined to fashion a
specific federal rule of decision to guide piercing inquiries under
CERCLA, relying instead on general federal standards for
disregarding the corporate entity.352  These courts found
insufficient congressional intent in the Act and its legislative
history to disregard the firmly entrenched doctrine of limited
liability for shareholders.353
In so concluding, the Acushnet River and Joslyn courts failed
to acknowledge the strong, albeit somewhat inconsistent, federal
policies undergirding CERCLA's liability scheme." 4 They also
351. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution,
675 F. Supp. 22, 32 (D. Mass. 1987). The Acushnet River court stated that:
(A] court should [not] summarily disregard the corporate fiction under the guise of
furthering some unspoken congressional intent. If a change so fundamental as to impose
CERCLA liability on parent corporations for no reason other than the fact that they did
not ignore the performance of their subsidiary is to come at all, it must come from the
Congress, not the courts. What the sovereigns request here is not the development of
federal common law, but an amendment to the statute.
Id. See also Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L James & Co., 893 P.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990). The
Joslyn court stated that:
Joslyn asks this court to rewrite the language of the Act significantly and hold parents
directly liable for their subsidiaries' activities. To do so would dramatically alter
traditional concepts of corporation law. The "normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific." Any bold rewriting of corporation law in this
area is best left to Congress.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Comment, Refining the Scope, supra note 64, at 75 n.189 (advocating
absolute liability of parent corporations under CERCLA, but acknowledging that congressional action,
in the form of a "comment," would be needed to effect this result).
352. See supra notes 243-252 and 260-268 and accompanying text (discussing the Acushnet
River and Joslyn courts' piercing tests).
353. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 32; Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 226.
354. See supra notes 292-336 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative goals of
CERCLA).
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neglected to heed the Supreme Court's directive that "the
interposition of a corporation will not be allowed to defeat
legislative policy, whether that was the aim or only the result of the
arrangement."
355
By insisting on total356 or inordinate357 domination of the
subsidiary by the parent and deliberate use of this control to cause
harm to a plaintiff as conditions of piercing the veil, 358 these
courts are erecting impediments to the achievement of the aims of
CERCLA's liability scheme of rapid site cleanup, corrective justice,
restitution, deterrence, cost-spreading and revenue raising.359
Moreover, their rule of decision is inconsistent with applicable
principles of statutory interpretation calling for harmonious and
liberal construction of remedial, health-based statutes.3" This
alternative rule of decision frustrates explicit congressional intent
that those responsible for creating hazardous waste problems pay
for the cleanup of the problems.36 This rule would shield
corporations which actively participated in the management of their
subsidiaries and benefitted from that involvement. By thus
impeding the aims of corrective justice and restitution, the
Joslyn/Acushnet rule also interferes significantly with the goals of
revenue raising to finance rapid site cleanup, since the rule
essentially forecloses liability of an entire class of solvent,
responsible parties.3 62 The Superfund would be depleted more
355. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 363 (1944).
356. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83-84.
357. Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 34.
358. Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83-84; Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33, 35.
359. See supra notes 292-325 and accompanying text (discussing these objectives which
Congress sought to advance through CERCLA).
360. See supra notes 332-336 and accompanying text (discussing these principles of statutory
interpretation).
361. See supra notes 48, 294 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent that those
responsible for the problems created by improper disposal of hazardous waste pay for the remediation
of the resulting damage).
362. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823,
848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984). In adopting an expansive definition of "owner or operator," the
Northeastern Pharmaceutical court stated that "[a] more restrictive interpretation would frustrate
congressional purpose by exempting from the operation of the Act a large class of persons who are
uniquely qualified to assume the burden imposed by it." Id. See also supra note 175 (noting that
the Eighth Circuit did not review the Northeastern Pharmaceutical trial court's definition of "owner
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rapidly,363 and the goal of cost-spreading among responsible
parties would be frustrated since other responsible parties are likely
to be jointly and severally liable.3 64 In addition, any deterrent
effect of CERCLA would be minimized under this rule, since,
unless the parent deliberately used a subsidiary to escape CERCLA
liability, a subsidiary could abandon an enterprise, sell off its
assets, and remain a judgment-proof corporate shell without having
liability attach to the parent, even if the parent actively participated
or operator").
363. To the extent that parent corporations who should be held liable as responsible parties are
not held liable, and to the extent that their shares of cleanup costs are not borne by remaining
responsible parties under joint and several liability, the Superfund will bear the cost. This would act
as an insurance-type remedy to spread the burden of cleanup costs to a broader base. See supra note
29 (soures of tax and other revenues which fund the Superfund). But c.f. infra note 364 and
accompanying text (to the extent that other responsible parties absorb the responsible but non-liable
parent's share because liability is joint and several, the goal of cost-spreading is frustrated). Shifting
the bulk of the financial burden from a relatively small group of industrial corporations who are
viewed as "responsible parties" to a broader base revenue source has been advocated on equity and
efficiency grounds. See, e.g., Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 332-44. Since disposal sites
which conformed with all applicable regulations in the past now pose substantial risks to public
health and the environment, it may be argued that the most equitable way of financing the cleanup
is to spread the risk and the financial burden among a large group. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEE rON & D. OwEN, PRossER & KEETON ON TORTs 24 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the risk-spreading
rationale). In addition, since the benefits, in the form of cost savings, of inadequate disposal of
hazardous waste did not accrue solely to the petrochemical industry but rather also to workers,
consumers and past shareholders, the equity argument for broadening the revenue base for Superfund
is strengthened. Congress, in broadening the base of taxpayers contributing to the Superfund by
adopting in SARA an "environmental tax" on corporations, responded to these arguments. As the
Senate Finance Committee reported in recommending an early version of this tax, "iMhe Committee
is of the view that the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites is a broad societal problem
extending beyond the chemical and petroleum industries. Thus, the committee recommended a new
excise tax on all manufacturing sectors of the economy." SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SUPERFUND
REvENTiE AcT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 73, 99th ong. Ist Sess. 13 (1985). However, opposition by the
Reagan administration to financing Superfund through a broad-based tax almost caused a pocket veto
of SARA. See Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod & O'Connors, supra note 37, at 10,366-70. As to efficiency
arguments for funding site cleanups from a broad revenue base, at least one commentator has argued
that funding derived exclusively through a system of taxation would avoid enormous and unnecessary
transaction costs entailed in the current complex system of apportioning site response and other
liability. Comment, Deep Pockets, supra note 45, at 332-44. See also supra note 284 (discussing
transaction costs). Although substituting a tax-based financing mechanism for CERCLA's existing
liability system might achieve a number of the goals of the current liability scheme, evaluation of this
alternative is beyond the scope of this Comment.
364. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several liability under
CERCLA); supra notes 316-320 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative objective of cost-
spreading among responsible parties).
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in the operation of the subsidiary and reaped benefits from those
activities."
Moreover, the Joslyr/Acushnet rule of decision is inconsistent
with an extensive body of case law holding personally liable
individual shareholders who actively participate in management of
a responsible party's operations.3" Since much of this case law
predated enactment of SARA, Congress' failure to amend the
statute to preclude such liability can be viewed as implicitly
endorsing a rule that individual shareholders who participate in the
operations of a responsible party may be held personally liable
under CERCLA.367 As the Nicolet court observed, in relying on
this case law to find that a parent corporation may be directly
liable,368 "[t]here is, of course, no basis, under CERCLA, to
distinguish between the liability of an individual stockholder who
actively participates in the management of a corporation and a
corporate stockholder which so participates. 3 69 Indeed, given the
courts' generally greater willingness to abrogate corporate limited
liability to hold a parent corporation liable as compared to an
individual controlling shareholder,37 the Joslyn/Acushnet rule is
not only inharmonious with the prevailing construction of
CERCLA's liability provisions but also contrary to the general
365. See Comment, Successor Liability, supra note 49, at 232 n.17 (noting that the
"disappearance" of potentially responsible parties often arises from corporate transactions).
366. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp.823,847-48, (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in relevant part, rev'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert denied484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052
(2d Cir. 1985); Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 1214, 1217-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913-14
(D.N.H. 1985); United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Pa. September 4, 1985).
367. See id. (citing cases, decided before passage of SARA in 1986, holding individual
shareholders personally liable).
368. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Nicolet court's ruling that
a parent corporation that directly participates in the management of a subsidiary may be directly
liable as an owner or operator).
369. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
370. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (noting that courts are more inclined to
pierce the corporate veil to abrogate the limited liability of corporations as distinguished from
individuals).
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purposes for which the privilege of limited liability was
created.3
71
3. Exercise of Control
A third alternative rule of decision, requiring that a parent
corporation actually exercise control over the management and
operations of a subsidiary responsible party if the parent is to be
derivatively liable under CERCLA, was most succinctly postulated
by the Nicolet court. The court held the parent's separate corporate
existence may be disregarded, and alternatively that the parent may
be held liable as an operator, if it had a substantial financial or
ownership interest in a subsidiary which is a potentially responsible
party under CERCLA, and if the parent exercised control over the
management and operations of the subsidiary.372 The essence of
this rule has also been adopted by the First Circuit in United States
v. Kayser-Roth Corp.3 7 3 and by the Northern District of Illinois
in Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp.374 Of
the three alternatives examined, this approach to determining parent
corporation liability is most consistent with CERCLA's objectives
and scheme of liability as interpreted by the courts.
By requiring the exercise of actual control over the subsidiary's
operations, as distinguished from the mere capacity to control, this
test furthers CERCLA's aim of corrective justice. Parent
corporations which have been actively involved in the operations
of their subsidiaries can be characterized as truly "responsible"
parties in a way that parents, simply by virtue of their financial
control, cannot.375
The proposed rule of decision does not, however, specify the
requisite degree of control which must be exercised for liability to
371. See id. (noting that courts may be more willing to abrogate the limited liability of a
corporation when another corporation, and not an individual shareholder, will then be held liable,
because the economic and other policy rationales for limited liability are not as clearly served.)
372. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202-03. But see id. at 1203-04 (stating that the parent may be
liable alternatively under the capacity to control standard).
373. 910 F.2d 24,27 (lst Cir. 1990).
374. 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. 111. 1988).
375. See id.
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attach to a parent corporation. While the proposed rule does not
provide the certainty of a bright-line test, as would a rule of strict
liability, the rule offers the countervailing advantage of being far
less arbitrary in its application and results." 6 A flexible rule of
decision enabling a court to consider the particular facts of a case
is consistent with, if not essential to, the equitable remedy of
disregarding the corporate entity.3"
As to the type and indicators of control over a subsidiary that
might be requisite for CERCLA liability to attach to a parent, two
factors are offered as sufficient but not necessary conditions. First,
control should be deemed sufficient if the parent has exercised
substantial control over management and operational decisions
relating to waste disposal and environmental control.378 Several
courts have focused their inquiries on evidence of parent
corporation control of operational and investment decisions in their
subsidiaries' waste management and related environmental
matters.379 Second, if a parent corporation has reaped substantial
financial benefit from its responsible party subsidiary, sufficient
control may be rebuttably presumed.8 Such a result is
compelled by the combination of CERCLA's restitution and
376. See supra note 345 and accompanying text (noting that even advocates of strict liability
for parent corporations of responsible parties acknowledge that such a rule would impose liability
arbitrarily).
377. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (noting that whether the piercing test is met
is a question of fact and not of law). See also Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D.
Il. 1990) (in considering whether a shareholder of a closely held corporation is liable as an operator,
the test is "heavily fact-specific, requiring an evaluation of the totality of the situation") (quoting
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1544 (W.D. Mich. 1989)); United States v. New
Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 869 (D. Del. 1989) (in considering whether to impose liability as
an operator, court must consider the "totality of circumstances" based upon the "unique factual
situation presented").
378. See Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 866 (the "control" prong of the alter ego
test should be modified under federal common law to reflect the policy of the applicable federal
statute, for example, in an antitrust case the court should focus on evidence tending to show control
of pricing and distribution decisions).
379. See supra notes 211, 220 (discussing the. Kayser-Roth and Rockwell courts' focus on the
parent corporations' control of their subsidiaries' environmental management practices).
380. Note, Alter Ego Doctrine, supra note 94, at 867.
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corrective justice aimsP" and the Act's strict liability
framework." 2
However, neither direct control of a subsidiary's pollution
control activities nor actual profit from the subsidiary's operation
should be necessary preconditions of parent corporation liability
under CERCLA. If other indicia of actual exercise of substantial
control of the subsidiary's operation can be proven, liability should
not be precluded. Any other result would have the inequitable
result of rewarding firms which ignored the environmental
operations of their subsidiaries but otherwise exercised pervasive
control, or which, for other reasons, simply failed to turn a profit
from their investment in a subsidiary operation.
Where neither control of environmental matters nor substantial
financial benefit can be shown, the threshold level of contact
between the parent and subsidiary for liability to attach to the
parent should be something more than merely exceeding a "pure
investment relationship," a standard which the Acushnet River
court rejected? a  On the other hand, requiring complete
domination and control under the traditional piercing doctrine8 4
is not consistent with the minimal emphasis CERCLA places on
the corporate form,3 8 nor with the Act's preeminent objective of
rapid cleanup of contaminated sites financed by those with some
connection to the site.386 The decision of what level of control is
sufficient for liability to attach to a parent of a responsible party
must be left to the courts' discretion in exercising their equitable
powers, based on the facts of each case and the Supreme Court's
381. See supra notes 48,294,299 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's foundation
in the objectives of corrective justice and restitution). See also supra note 177 and accompanying text
(Northeastern Pharmaceutical court's fiding that Congress has determined that those who bore the
fruits of hazardous waste disposal also bear the costs of cleaning it up).
382. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing strict liability under the At).
383. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675
F. Supp. 22, 31-32 (D. Mass 1987).
384. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (level of control required to pierce should be
substantially more than that which could be exercised by any majority shareholder).
385. See supra notes 330-331 and accompanying text (discussing cases finding that CERCLA
places little emphasis on the corporate form).
386. See supra notes 292-295 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's preeminent
objective of expeditious cleanup of contaminated sites by those connected to the site).
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directive that the corporate fiction not be allowed to interfere with
the attainment of congressional objectives." 7
Conspicuously absent from the proposed rule of decision are
the second and third prongs of the traditional piercing test, namely
that the control of the subsidiary be used by the parent wrongfully
or for an improper purpose and that the plaintiff's injury be clearly
related to the parent's control. 8 However, there is ample
precedent for disregarding the corporate fiction on the basis of the
control prong alone, not only in applications of the piercing
doctrine in causes of action based on contract and tort,389 but
especially in actions under federal statutes.39 Moreover, in the
more general formulation of the piercing doctrine,391 the second
prong requires merely that "if the acts are treated as those of the
corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.""
A rule of decision requiring that the parent's control of the
subsidiary be used to evade a statutory duty under CERCLA would
be patently inconsistent with the Act's aims and scheme of liability.
Liability under CERCLA is imposed retroactively and without
fault, for the purpose of remedying environmental hazards created
by companies which may have managed their wastes in full
compliance with existing law. To require a parent to have used its
subsidiary intentionally to evade a statutory duty would effectively
exempt all parent corporations from liability for the costs of
cleanup of their responsible party subsidiary's inadequate waste
management practices, regardless of the extent to which they may
have exercised pervasive control of or profited from those
practices. Such an outcome would clearly and significantly frustrate
387. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 363 (1944).
388. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text (discussing the second and third prongs
of the traditional piercing test).
389. See supra notes 122-141 (under traditional piercing inquiries, the test is applied flexibly
and there is precedent for piercing solely on the basis of the first prong).
390. See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text (criteria for piercing, including the
threshold degree of control, under federal common law are tailored to the policies undergirding the
applicable statute).
391. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong test).
392. Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d
1, 3 (1957).
931
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 22
CERCLA's objectives of corrective justice, restitution, cost-
spreading, and financing rapid cleanup of contaminated sites.
Moreover, such a result would not be countenanced by the
Supreme Court's mandate that interposition of the corporate form
"not be allowed to defeat a legislative policy, whether that was the
aim or only the result of the arrangement." 393
Finally, the proposed rule of decision is consistent with the
large majority of district and appellate courts' tests for direct
liability of a shareholder as an owner or operator under CERCLA
section 107." Specifically, that test premises liability of a
shareholder395 on the active participation or control over the
activities of a facility at which hazardous wastes are generated or
393. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 363 (1944) (citing cases).
394. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing the case law on liability of
individual shareholders as owners or operators). This proposed rule is also consistent with the EPA
Enforcement Division's policy on the liability of corporate shareholders. Memorandum, Liability of
Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), from Courtney M. Price,
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, to Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Associate Enforcement
Counsel for Waste, Regional Administrators, and Regional Counsels, June 13, 1984.
395. The courts have not yet defined the boundaries of the word "owner" in sections 107(a)(l)
and 107(a)(2). See Comment, Refining the Scope, supra note 64, at 51. The case law on individual
shareholder liability under CERCLA, which also predicates liability on active management
participation, suggests that at least some courts will interpret the term "owner" expansively,
extending liability to encompass not only those having controlling interest in facilities, but also those
which have virtually any ownership interest in a facility. See United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (stating that "[t]he
statute literally reads that a person who owns interest in a facility and is actively participating in its
management can be held liable for the disposal of hazardous waste"); United States v. Mimbile, No.
84-2280, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (stating that -an individual who owns stock in a
corporation and who actively participates in its management can be held liable for cleanup costs
incurred as a result of improper disposal by the corporation"); United States v. McGraw-Edison Co.,
718 F. Supp. 154, 156-158 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting contention that because defendant was a
minority (49%) shareholder of a responsible party defendant could not as a matter of law be held
liable as an "owner" under section 107). Accordingly, it is not clear whether sections 107(a)(1) and
107(a)(2) exempt from liability a corporation which is not a majority shareholder in another
corporation but which owns enough stock to have defacto control of the second corporation. See
Comment, Refining the Scope, supra note 64, at 51 n.50 (noting that a corporation may have defacto
control of a large, publicly-traded corporation by owning as little as 25 to 30 percent of the
corporation's common stock (citing P. BLUMBERO, THE LAw OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
PROBLEMS IN TE LAW Op PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS, APP. § 22.02.1 at 425 (1985)).
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disposed of."' Adoption of the proposed rule of decision would
thus promote consistency, equity and predictability within
CERCLA's liability scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
CERCLA's vaguely drafted liability provisions, as expansively
interpreted by the courts to impose joint and several strict liability
without proof of causation, tend to serve the somewhat
incompatible ends of providing funds for the rapid cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites, corrective justice, restitution and
deterrence. One of the few remaining unresolved issues under
CERCLA's liability scheme is the legal standard under which the
corporate entity of an insolvent responsible party will be
disregarded to hold a parent corporation liable for site cleanup and
related costs. The courts which have addressed this issue in recent
years have held that a uniform federal rule of decision should be
crafted to guide such inquiries. However, following in a long
tradition of inconsistent and unclear applications of various
versions of the piercing doctrine under state common law and
federal statutory law, the courts have been far from consistent in
their various formulations of a "uniform" rule. The courts have
articulated tests predicating liability on mere capacity to control the
operations of a subsidiary, on traditional piercing doctrine requiring
the parent's total domination and control of the subsidiary and the
purposeful use of that control to perpetrate a wrong, and on the
actual exercise of control by a parent of a subsidiary's operations.
The general objectives compelling development of a uniform
federal rule to guide piercing inquiries, coupled with the need for
a predictable piercing test which will provide incentives to
settlement of CERCLA liability matters to expedite efficient site
cleanup, call for the federal courts to resolve conflicting approaches
to piercing inquiries, particularly since Congress is unlikely to act
soon to decide the issue. The courts should be guided in their
396. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing the case law on liability of
individual shareholders as owners or operators).
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choice of a truly uniform rule by the purposes advanced by
CERCLA's liability scheme.
Evaluation of the alternative rules advanced by the courts to
date supports the conclusion that neither strict liability for parent
corporations nor the application of the traditional two- or three-
prong piercing test is consonant with most of the objectives served
by CERCLA's system of liability. Rather, a test which requires the
actual exercise of control over the operation of a subsidiary
responsible party most closely conforms to the important statutory
aims of CERCLA.
Evelyn F. Heidelberg
934
